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Regulatory governance of international 
recruitment is the crux of the challenges 
associated with international labour migration. 
This study suggests that Bangladesh has been 
trying to make international recruitment cost 
effective, transparent, and consistent by bringing 
into force a variety of measures. Bangladesh also 
took on the challenge of formulating and adopting 
comprehensive national laws and policies on 
labour migration. This study highlights challenges 
that need to be overcome to strengthen labour 
migration governance, as well as, the long walk to 
reform that has yet to be covered. Implementation 
of this study would not have been possible without 
the interest and cooperation of Zafar Ahmed Khan 
(PhD), who was the Secretary to the Ministry of 
Expatriates’ Welfare and Overseas Employment 
when this study was completed; Begum Shamsun 
Nahar, who is the Director-General of the Bureau 
of Manpower Employment and Training; and 
Hazarat Ali, who is the Additional Secretary to the 
Ministry. 
The study points out that the conditions 
surrounding the regulatory governance of 
international recruitment significantly impact the 
wellbeing of workers and their households. It is 
also an issue that affects the efficiency with which 
the international labour market is able to reach 
workers and vice-versa. 
Switzerland, like Bangladesh, looks at migration 
and development from a perspective of improving 
employment and income. The Swiss Agency for 
Development and Cooperation (SDC) engagement 
with the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
and the Government of Bangladesh on the issue 
of labour migration is in line with the objective of 
the Swiss Cooperation Strategy (2013-2017) “to 
enhance employment and income and improve 
access to services and opportunities”. The 
SDC sees international employment as being 
complementary to employment growth in the 
domestic economies of origin countries. Given the 
high scale of labour migration from Bangladesh, 
it is crucial that governance is strengthened to 
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regulate recruitment and ensure protection of 
the workers from exploitation. Good regulatory 
governance also contributes to the issue of 
equitable growth and human rights-based poverty 
reduction.
Bangladesh has entered into bilateral 
understandings with some countries of destination 
as a way to bring more protection to its workers. 
These agreements are potential areas of growth 
because these can be used to come up with 
distinctive roles for a variety of actors involved 
in international labour migration. The provisions 
of these Memorandums of Understanding 
(MOUs), if compliant with ILO labour standards 
and consistently pursued, can be effective tools 
of labour migration management, in particular, 
for regulating recruitment agents. Three ILO 
instruments, the Migration for Employment 
Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97), the Migrant 
Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 
1975 (No. 143), and the Private Employment 
Agencies Convention, 1997 (No. 181), if ratified, 
provide a legally binding framework for such MOUs. 
These three instruments are complemented by the 
Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration, which 
is a highly effective resource for the formulation of 
such MOUs.
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and Cooperation
Dhaka
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Summary
Key issues
The demographic dividend is an inextricable 
part of the economy of Bangladesh and is highly 
prospective, letting a window of opportunity swing 
open for the nation in the form of new economic 
development. As many countries experience 
local shortages of labour, Bangladesh is in a 
creditable position to provide much needed 
workers, thereby extracting a positive outcome 
out of its migrant workforce. Remittance from 
Bangladeshi migrant workers is prominently 
considered to be a major determinant of the 
economic development of Bangladesh over the 
last decade. What is crystal clear from several 
survey findings is that the influx of remittance 
into Bangladesh has had a considerable positive 
impact upon household-level poverty alleviation 
across the country. Moreover, returning migrant 
workers have great potential to further develop 
the economy of Bangladesh by virtue of the skills 
they acquired overseas.
However, migrant workers incur a huge number 
of social and economic costs through the labour 
migration process. Any in-depth analysis of 
remittance-led socio-economic development must 
consider the extent to which such costs ought to 
be considered and integrated into the research 
perspective. These costs involve not only the actual 
monetary costs, but also various opportunity costs 
related to recruitment and migration. In addition, 
the costs of migration should not be viewed merely 
from an economic perspective. Rather, a human 
rights-oriented approach to the issue is essential 
and earnestly needed.
Private recruiting agencies recruit the majority of 
Bangladeshi migrant workers. Moreover, a large 
number of migrant workers obtain work permits 
through dalals, who are illegal sub-agents or 
intermediaries. Lacking legally valid documentation 
and approval to emigrate to a destination country, 
workers, in many instances, resort to irregular 
channels. In addition, the migration of many 
a person initially takes place through regular, 
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authorized channels, but they ultimately end up 
as irregular migrants later in the process. Although 
some irregular migrants do become documented 
in later phases, but most remain undocumented 
and, in turn, get exposed to insecurity.
Human trafficking, forced labour, debt-bondage, 
and loss of remittance are attributable to the high 
cost of recruitment and migration. Inadequate 
scope for migration on a regular basis places 
potential migrants under a compulsion to 
make unlawful deals with recruiting agencies/
intermediaries/individual brokers. Even during 
the pre-arrival stage, before they have even made 
it to their place of employment, many workers 
are bonded by the fees they have paid and the 
commitments they have made to brokers.
The driving force behind the costs of recruitment 
and migration has, in some cases, been contested, 
leading to diverging views of the issue. Certain 
stakeholders in the migration process (such as 
recruiting agencies) ascribe the high migration 
costs to market-driven factors (namely, the 
demand and supply of labour), while others see 
the high costs as the result of a lack of regulation 
in the overseas recruitment sector. 
Under the supervision, direction, and control of 
the Ministry of Expatriates’ Welfare and Overseas 
Employment (MEWOE) and the Bureau of 
Manpower, Employment and Training (BMET), 
868 international recruiting agencies are currently 
in operation in Bangladesh. In addition a large 
number of sub-agents and intermediaries (dalals) 
operate across the country. Migrant workers, while 
setting up a deal with a particular recruitment 
channel at the initial stage, consider the following 
factors: trust and loyalty, assurance of support at 
destination countries, familiarity, and proximity. 
About 53 per cent of migrant workers utilize these 
intermediaries, while 13 per cent of migrants 
migrate through private recruiting agencies. 
In fact, many an intermediary, as the findings 
reveal, serves as an agent of the private recruiting 
agencies.
The cost of overseas labour migration from 
Bangladesh is considered one of the most 
expensive in the world. The average migrant worker 
spends 309,259 Bangladeshi taka (BDT) on their 
recruitment and migration. Such a burdensome cost 
poses risks for the worker and threatens to dampen 
the positive impact of international migration upon 
the socio-economic development of Bangladesh. 
Moreover, it threatens the social protection of the 
migrant workers and their households. To address 
the issue, the government has set a maximum cost 
for certain destination countries. The recruiting 
agents are mandated to not demand any more 
than this maximum from potential migrants. But 
in reality, Bangladeshi migrants pay much more 
than the prescribed amount. One particularly 
striking feature of the labour migration process is 
that about 78 per cent of the total recruitment and 
migration cost is pocketed by dalals, who are illegal 
intermediaries or sub-agents in Bangladesh and 
the countries of destination. 
The manner in which many workers finance 
their migration often ultimately turns out to be 
burdensome for them. About 67 per cent of 
migrants obtain funding in order to pay recruitment 
and migration costs by borrowing money. A 
considerable portion of migrant workers (nearly 
24 per cent) finance their migration by selling 
land, and 23 per cent acquire the needed funds 
by mortgaging land. 
One of the prime reasons underlying increasing 
recruitment and migration costs and the 
exploitation of migrant workers is visa-trading. 
The Kafala system prevalent in Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) countries requires each migrant 
worker to have a Kafeel, or sponsor. The employer, 
who is the Kafeel for a potential migrant worker, 
may be an individual citizen or a company. The 
Kafeels often trade the visas that allow the migrants 
to work and reside in the country for a high sum of 
money. Recruiting agents compete to “buy” these 
visas, and then recover the cost from the migrant 
workers. This cost is in addition to the other costs 
and service charges that the migrant workers have 
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to bear. The trade in visas is complex. Often, the 
visas are first purchased by a particular illegal 
intermediary or sub-agent and then may be resold 
to one or more recruitment agents in Bangladesh. 
However, if that particular illegal intermediary or 
sub-agent fails to meet the terms and conditions of 
the Kafeel, that Kafeel may sell these work visas to 
another illegal intermediary or sub-agent. Similar 
trading may take place between the Bangladeshi 
recruitment agent and illegal intermediaries or sub-
agents who are offering the best prices. Practices 
such as these make the costs of recruitment and 
migration unpredictable and inflated. 
This study finds that upon reaching countries of 
destination, 21 per cent of Bangladeshi migrant 
workers who already had employment contracts 
found that their work was not as stipulated in the 
contract, and about 46 per cent were deprived of 
the remuneration specified in their employment 
contract. One of the major factors that makes 
migrant workers vulnerable to such malpractices 
is the lack of education and knowledge among 
migrants. In many cases, migrant workers are 
unable to interpret clauses, conditions, and 
loopholes in their contracts due to lack of relevant 
knowledge skills or an inability to interpret the 
complex language used.
In fact, the majority of migrant workers do not 
receive a written contract during the pre-departure 
period, irrespective of their type of visa. In some 
cases, it is the recruiting agents who do not provide 
adequate information prior to departure, thereby 
depriving migrant workers of the appropriate 
knowledge likely to empower them to attain the 
entitlements they should lawfully hold. 
Considering the importance of labour migration, 
the Government of Bangladesh has taken several 
steps over the last decade. However, gaps in the 
legal and policy regime continue to exist. In view 
of the recently passed Overseas Employment and 
Migrants’ Act, 2013, the prevailing Emigration 
Rules, the Recruiting Agents Conduct and License 
Rules, and the Wage Earners’ Welfare Fund 
Rules need revision. The Overseas Employment 
Policy 2006 has certain inherent drawbacks that 
make it inadequate to guide the regulation of 
recruiting agents and social protection of migrant 
workers. There is an urgent need to formulate a 
new Overseas Employment Policy that is based 
in the realities of Bangladeshi migrant workers’ 
experiences and that works towards employment 
promotion without compromising social protection 
for the workers. Until these revisions are completed 
and adopted and new measures are brought in, 
implementation of existing legal measures are 
critical in ensuring an ethical and transparent 
recruitment and migration process.
Challenges
n	 The prevailing unethical practices of dalals, or 
the illegal intermediaries and sub-agents, undo 
the positive steps taken by the government for 
improving labour migration governance. Dalals 
operate without any legal basis. As a result of 
their fraudulent actions, the cost of recruitment 
and migration soars upward. Since the costs 
charged by dalals are illegal, these remain 
undocumented. The recruiting agents utilize 
dalals in order to reach potential migrant workers 
because, until the Overseas Employment 
and Migrants Act, 2013, was passed by the 
Parliament in October 2013, recruiting agents 
could not open sub-offices at the district level. 
Even with the new Act in force, it is likely that 
recruiting agents will continue using the dalals 
to reach communities from which migrants 
are recruited. Dalals are usually known within 
their communities, and consequently, potential 
migrants and their family members are able to 
access them more easily than the recruiting 
agents. Recruiting agents and their dalals are 
equipped with the means to circumvent the 
legal and policy regime. Recruitment through 
individual initiatives – such as the buying 
and selling of visas among employers, illegal 
intermediaries and sub-agents, and to migrants 
– is a known but unremedied feature of labour 
migration from Bangladesh. 
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n	 Recruiting agents buy job contracts from 
sub-agents (often nationals of Bangladesh, 
Sri Lanka, and India) located in destination 
countries. The existence of such middlemen 
makes the price of job offers go higher and 
higher. This cost falls upon the shoulders of 
migrant workers as an escalating burden. 
n	 Visa trading in GCC countries and the 
consequent competition among recruiting 
agents leads to exploitation of the workers by 
the dalals and recruiting agents in Bangladesh 
and abuse and exploitation by the Kafeels or 
the employers in the GCC countries.
n	 Migrant workers rarely have a chance to make 
payments in a formal manner. They are hardly 
ever given receipts. Payments are made 
informally by workers, as well as by recruiting 
agents, to dalals and vice-versa. This situation 
makes it difficult for the government authorities 
in Bangladesh and countries of destination to 
regulate recruitment and migration costs. 
n	 Finding financing for recruitment and 
migration costs is another major challenge. 
Lack of access to the formal credit system 
forces migrant workers to rely on informal, 
unregulated lenders who charge high interest 
rates. This, in turn, pushes the real cost of 
recruitment and migration upward.
n	 Many a migrant worker does not peruse their 
contract. Indeed, recruiting agents and dalals 
often circumvent the obligatory requirement 
of showing recruited workers their contract 
papers. In the event that recruited workers do 
demand to see their contracts, it often is to 
little purpose because language barriers and/
or highly technical language pre-empt them 
from comprehending the terms and conditions 
specified in the document. 
n	 From time to time, recruiting agents hide 
pertinent information from both employers 
and migrant workers. For example, some 
agents will provide lower-skilled workers 
when employers have requested semi-skilled 
workers. When employers see the quality of 
the work performed or discover the inability of 
the worker to perform the task at the required 
skill level, they decline to pay the salary that 
was originally agreed. 
n	 Migrant workers do not have the right to seek 
direct legal redress. Only the government 
can lodge complaints related to violations of 
provisions of the ordinance. 
n	 BMET’s supervision of recruiting agents is 
cumbersome and does not prove effective in 
hastening a change in the existing situation. 
The existing policies, ordinances, acts, and 
rules with regard to recruitment management 
and the migration process are not sufficient 
to ensure a decent labour recruitment and 
migration process in Bangladesh. 
n	 The Government of Bangladesh is yet to 
explore the possibility of bilateral agreements 
with the destination countries to address 
the role of illegal sub-agents in countries of 
destination.
n	 The right of migrant workers to form an 
association has not been translated into action 
both in destination countries and countries of 
origin. The exercising of such a right would 
enable migrant workers to collectively raise the 
issue of unethical labour migration practices 
on national and international platforms and 
provide protection to individual workers, who 
otherwise may face adverse reactions if they 
speak out. 
n	 Awareness among potential migrant workers 
regarding the labour recruitment and migration 
process is very low. What is immediately 
needed in the context of the migration issue is 
an effective mechanism for the dissemination 
of knowledge. Such a mechanism should be 
activated at full gallop. 
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Recommendations
n	 Reduction of recruitment and migration cost 
through intervention on the demand side 
(migrant worker perspective): By raising 
awareness among the potential migrant 
workers about the migration process and 
recruitment system, more sustainable ethical 
practices of migration can be ensured. For the 
sake of generating awareness regarding ethical 
migration practice, the following measures can 
be taken: (1) Since the information gap halts 
the smooth operation of the migration system 
and, in turn, leads to human trafficking and 
unofficial migration, a detailed understanding 
of overseas labour recruitment can empower 
potential migrants to bargain successfully 
with recruiting agents/illegal intermediaries 
or sub-agents. Against the backdrop of such 
migration issues, the government needs to 
incorporate information regarding the labour 
migration process into education curriculums 
and textbooks (at the primary, secondary, and 
tertiary levels); and (2) By launching a mass 
media campaign on labour migration process 
(frequent advertisements on TV, radio, and 
in newspapers), the government can raise 
awareness among potential migrants about 
labour migration issues.
n	 Elimination of costs borne by migrant workers: 
As per Article 7, Clause 1 of the International 
Labour Organization’s Private Employment 
Agencies Convention, 1997 (No. 181), 
member States need to take initiative in line 
with the principle that “Private employment 
agencies shall not charge directly or indirectly, 
in whole or in part, any fees or costs to 
workers”. In line with this benchmark, the 
Government of Bangladesh can devise policy 
and regulatory instruments to ensure that all 
such costs are to be borne by employers. 
n	 Initiatives for curbing the role of sub-agents/
intermediaries: The involvement of illegal 
intermediaries or sub-agents in the migration 
process leads to an increase in labour 
recruitment and migration costs. Steps are 
needed to eliminate illegal actors and actions 
from the labour migration process and to 
promote regular migration: 
(1) regulating recruiting agents under the 
Overseas Employment and Migrants Act, 
2013; 
(2) taking control of the recruitment 
initiative by developing safe migration 
corridor arrangements through bilateral 
agreements and by clearly laying out the 
role of the recruitment agents; 
(3) strengthening the relevant government 
agent, namely, BOESL, to enable it to 
manage recruitment for those overseas 
jobs where the probability of labour rights 
and human rights violations are the 
highest; 
(4) identifying new overseas job markets and 
negotiating placement of Bangladesh 
workers; 
(5)  mass awareness in rural and semi-urban 
areas about illegal intermediaries or sub-
agents; 
(6)  developing trust-building initiatives 
through the decentralization of the labour 
migration process; 
(7)  negotiating government control and 
oversight of the recruitment of workers in 
countries of destination; and
 (8) reorganizing and strengthening labour 
attaché mechanism. 
n	 Oversight and supervision of recruiting 
agents: In a free-market economy, the role of 
recruiting agents as job placement agencies 
in the recruitment process is unavoidable. 
Hence, concerted efforts are needed to bring 
recruitment agencies under public scrutiny 
and accountability to the tripartite actors.
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n	 Oversight and supervision of recruiting agents: 
In order to ensure compliance with any code of 
conduct, an internal compliance mechanism 
may prove effective and sustainable. The 
institutional capacity of associations of 
recruitment agents, with regard to developing 
and managing a compliance mechanism at the 
level of the association, should be supported 
by the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
and additional efforts should be made to bring 
in collective oversight by the tripartite actors 
– government, the ILO, and trade unions and 
migrant workers associations.
n	 Provision of financing for labour migration 
cost from formal financing institutions: Lack 
of access to the formal credit/lending system 
leads migrant workers to finance their 
migration costs through illegal or informal 
channels. Considering the high interest rates 
on credit from illegal or informal channels, 
the total migration cost turns out to be far 
more than the cost that is typically estimated. 
Therefore, the inclusion of potential migrant 
workers’ credit needs in the formal lending/
loan systems of the public and private sector 
banks is necessary. 
n	 Ensuring migrant workers’ right to information: 
Mechanisms need to be developed by the 
government to compel recruiting agents to 
share all relevant information with migrant 
workers and in such a way that puts migrants 
in the best possible position (e.g., Bengali 
versions of contract papers and easily 
understandable technical legal statements). 
The government can ensure migrant workers’ 
right to information through: (1) Monthly 
publication of information on the grading results 
for recruiting agents who have valid licenses 
and are ranked based on their conduct and 
performance; (2) Dissemination of information 
on unethical practices in migration though 
decentralized workshops, seminars, etc.; (3) 
Dissemination of relevant information during 
pre-departure briefings by the BMET; and 
(4) A government order requiring recruiting 
agents to disseminate information about the 
labour migration process through electronic 
and print media. 
n	 Incorporation of proper documentation 
facilities: Through the BMET and MEWOE, 
the Government of Bangladesh has already 
implemented several documentation 
mechanisms for labour migration purposes. 
However, a single database platform containing 
all the relevant pieces of information, such 
as National ID card, passport, recruitment 
information (including follow-up information), 
etc., needs to be developed.
n	 Government needs to promote migrant workers’ 
right to association: The Government of 
Bangladesh needs to promote the formation 
of labour associations of migrant workers. The 
creation of trade unions in Bangladesh and 
also in destination countries or membership in 
existing local trade unions, as may be permitted 
by the local labour laws, can increase the 
bargaining power of migrant workers.
n	 Extensive empirical research: Policy-
makers find it extremely difficult to 
formulate any policy in connection with 
labour migration owing to the inadequate 
availability of information about the issue. 
Hence, the labour migration system needs 
to be explored and analyzed. In a true 
sense, it needs to be overhauled by the 
initiation of extensive empirical research. 
Cooperation can be established among 
countries of destination and origin and also 
with international organizations like ILO 
and United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) in order to 
develop labour migration-oriented surveys/
censuses.
n	 Expansion of technical capacities of MEWOE 
and BMET: In recent years, MEWOE and BMET 
have diversified their activities in an effort to 
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deal with labour recruitment and migration 
issues effectively. However, despite these 
initiatives, both are still in need of specialized 
workforce and technical resources. For 
instance, 42 District Employment Manpower 
Offices (DEMOs) have been established, and 
the direction is towards setting up DEMOs in 
every district of Bangladesh. The DEMOs need 
to be given adequate numbers of technical staff 
and qualified community outreach staff and 
made subject to performance monitoring.
n	 Bilateral agreements between Bangladesh and 
destination countries: Bangladesh should hold 
negotiations with the destination countries on 
the globally acceptable minimum standards for 
labour migration and wages. The government 
can also negotiate for possible demand-
driven recruitment by employers in destination 
countries, with oversight roles in those countries 
being provided by the relevant ministry (e.g., the 
Ministry of Labour) and employers’ associations. 
Likewise, under such an arrangement, the 
MEWOE would play a regulatory role for 
recruitment of workers in Bangladesh.
n	 Coordination with  the ILO as an  intergovernmental 
intermediary: The Government of Bangladesh 
and the ILO should enter into a multi-year 
tripartite partnership programme, spanning 
a decade or more, for the realization of the 
agenda of decent work for Bangladeshi migrant 
workers. The partnership should bring technical 
support for addressing issues of recruitment, 
contract standards, labour mobility modalities, 
protection of workers, social security of migrant 
workers, social and professional reintegration of 
returning migrant workers, etc.
n	 Addressing gaps in inter-agency coordination 
mechanisms: A network of stakeholders should 
be formed to bring public oversight over 
the labour migration process. A higher level 
coordination platform, comprising of ministers 
and secretaries, is also needed to simplify 
bureaucratic processes, including passports, 
registration in Bangladesh and with Bangladeshi 
Missions, technical training certifications, 
social security, support to returning workers for 
reintegration, etc.
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Given the challenges around the issue of 
recruitment cost, we have been of the opinion 
that knowledge-building about the issue is core to 
the solution to this problem. There is a need for 
our workers, their representatives, and overseas 
employers to follow the conduct legally prescribed 
for the actors involved in international recruitment. 
Data is needed to ensure that there is enough 
evidence to prevent fraud from taking place and to 
update policy measures at regular intervals. There 
is a need for wider knowledge of the issues in the 
international recruitment chain that make workers 
vulnerable to exploitation. We are attempting to 
regulate recruitment in an environment where the 
number of workers available for work is higher than 
Statement
from the Secretary
the number of jobs available. This situation gives an 
upper hand to unscrupulous elements. Oftentimes, 
information is deliberately not made available 
to workers by those engaged in international 
recruitment. They take advantage of the situation 
to extort the maximum amount possible from 
workers. This in turn leads to indebtedness among 
workers and their households, and also creates an 
environment where workers run the risk of being 
trafficked or smuggled. More often than not, the 
government gets to know about these issues only 
when things go wrong and workers are already 
trapped. We believe research and communication 
of research findings among workers is one of the 
key elements in overcoming this situation.
I would like to thank the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) for their technical assistance 
in taking this social dialogue forward. This study 
report can lead to further improvement in evidence-
based international recruitment regulation. The 
government is committed to reviewing and revising 
the rules and procedures in a manner that would 
improve the returns of overseas employment for 
workers and their households.
Dr. Zafar Ahmed Khan
Secretary
Ministry of Expatriates’ Welfare & Overseas 
Employment
Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh
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Introduction,  
study objectives,  
and methodology
C h a p t e r   1
1.1 Introduction
The association between migration for employment 
and economic development has become one of the 
key issues in development discourse. In a country like 
Bangladesh, this association holds more significance, 
since the population demography of Bangladesh is 
turning out to be an asset. In fact, the demographic 
dividend (i.e., the prevalence of a young working age 
population) of Bangladesh has opened a window of 
opportunity for a new form of economic development 
for the country. Labour migration from Bangladesh 
is transforming the socio-economic structure of the 
country.
The cost
Causes of and redress related to the high recruitment and migration costs in Bangladesh
2
Table 1.1: Flow of international labour migration from Bangladesh 2001–June 2013)
Year
Official number of migrant workers
Total Male Women
2001 188 686 188 027 659
2002 225 256 224 040 1 216
2003 254 190 251 837 2 353
2004 272 958 261 699 11 259
2005 252 702 239 132 13 570
2006 381 516 363 471 18 045
2007 832 609 813 515 19 094
2008 875 055 854 213 20 842
2009 475 278 453 054 22 224
2010 390 702 362 996 27 706
2011 568 062 537 483 30 579
2012 607 798 570 494 37 304
2013 (through June) 208 340 181 289 27 051
Source: BMET, http://www.bmet.org.bd/BMET/viewStatReport.action?reportnumber=18 [accessed 25 July 2013].
Since the beginnings of official labour migration 
from Bangladesh, more than 8 million Bangladeshi 
migrant workers1 have migrated to various counties 
in order to change their economic status. Between 
1976 and June 2013, a total 8,516,089 workers 
migrated from Bangladesh to various countries.2 
This scenario suggests that Bangladesh is the 
second largest labour originating country in the 
world. The flow of labour migration over the years 
generally exhibits an increasing trend (Table 
1 According to the Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 
1949 (No. 97) and the Migrant Workers (Supplementary 
Provisions) Convention, 1975 (No. 143), “migrant worker” refers 
to a person who migrates from one country to another country 
with a view to being employed otherwise than on his or her own 
account. However, the following five categories of person cannot 
be considered as migrant worker: frontier workers, artists and 
members of the liberal professions who have entered the country 
on a short-term basis, seafarers, persons who migrate for training 
or education, and employees of organizations or undertakings 
operating within the territory of a country who have been admitted 
temporarily to that country at the request of their employer to 
undertake specific duties or assignments, for a limited and defined 
period of time, and who are required to leave that country on the 
completion of their duties or assignments. 
2 Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training (BMET), http://
www.bmet.org.bd/BMET/viewStatReport.action?reportnumber=37 
[accessed 28 July 2013].
1.1). In addition, men and women workers are 
finding niches in this sector.3 In fact, economic 
globalization in the 1980s and 1990s instigated 
an international rise in the demand for skilled, 
as well as less-skilled, migrant workers globally 
(Castles & Davidson, 2000, cited in Barai, 2012). 
This external demand opened up opportunities 
for a large number of Bangladeshi (mostly semi-
skilled and less-skilled) workers to be employed 
overseas. Bangladeshis migrated due to several 
pull factors (e.g., demand for labour overseas, 
high wages in countries of destination, assistance 
of relatives living abroad) and push factors (e.g., 
poverty, unemployment/ underemployment/
disguised unemployment, landlessness, lack of 
development in rural areas, etc.).
Since the inception of labour migration from 
Bangladesh in the 1970s, Middle Eastern countries 
are the principle destinations for workers from 
Bangladesh. An analysis of migration-oriented 
data over the last decade reveals that about four-
3 In 2012, about 6.14 per cent of the outbound migrant workers 
were women (as shown in Table 1.1).
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fifths of all Bangladeshi migrant workers headed 
to Middle Eastern countries. The majority of 
Bangladeshi migrant workers are working in Saudi 
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, 
Oman, Malaysia, and Singapore (Table 1.2). In 
addition, workers are migrating to Bahrain, Qatar, 
Jordan, Lebanon, the Republic of Korea, Brunei, 
Mauritius, the United Kingdom, and Ireland. 
Table 1.2: Top destination countries for 
Bangladeshi migrant workers (1976–June 2013) 
Country
No. of migrant 
workers
Percentage of 
total migration
Saudi Arabia 2 626 626 30.84
UAE 2 294 695 26.95
Malaysia 702 308 8.25
Oman 779 614 9.15
Singapore 456 195 5.36
Kuwait 479 650 5.63
Bahrain 262 611 3.08
Qatar 237 519 2.75
Source: BMET, http://www.bmet.org.bd/BMET/viewStatReport.
action?reportnumber=37 [accessed 25 July 2013].
If countries of destination are taken into account, 
a significant change is notable in the migration 
pattern over the last decade. In 2001, about 
72 per cent Bangladeshi workers went to Saudi 
Arabia, but this decreased to only 3 per cent of 
migrant departures in 2011. On the other hand, 
in 2001 only about 9 per cent of migrant workers 
went to the United Arab Emirates, but that portion 
reached 49 per cent in 2011. Likewise, in 2001, 
only about 4 per cent Bangladeshi migrant went to 
countries outside the Middle East, but this figure 
increased to 13 per cent in 2011. 
The outcome of such trends seems quite 
positive for the Bangladesh economy in terms 
of outstanding remittance flow (a glance of 
remittance scenario of Bangladesh is shown in 
Box 1.1) and beneficiary households. In addition, 
returning migrant workers have great potential for 
the Bangladesh economy through the utilization of 
skills they acquired overseas.
However, this migration-based development also 
has socio-economic costs and opportunity costs. 
Many a migrant worker gets exposed to serious 
abuse and exploitation during the migration 
phase in both countries of origin and destination. 
In addition to exploitation and harassment in 
workplace, unethical labour recruitment is 
becoming one of the key concerns for national and 
transnational policy-makers. The exorbitant cost 
of recruitment and migration is one components 
of the unethical recruitment process. The cost 
of recruitment and migration has become a 
major area of state intervention, and should not 
be seen merely from economic perspective, but 
also through the lens of a human rights-based 
approach.
Most Bangladeshi migrant workers are recruited 
by private recruiting agencies. The MEWOE and 
BMET are the government authorities tasked with 
managing whole migration process and ensuring 
the welfare of migrant workers. At present (2013), 
Box 1.1: Wage earners’ remittance flow to 
Bangladesh: At a glance
n	 In 2012 the remittance sent to Bangladesh by the wage earners was US$14.2 billion.
n Remittance is the largest single source of foreign exchange for Bangladesh. Remittance was 
more than ten times larger than the official development assistance received by Bangladesh 
in FY 2010-11.
n In 2012, Bangladesh ranked sixth among the top 10 remittance-receiving countries; and was 
the second largest remittance receiver in South Asia (World Bank, 2012).
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868 registered recruiting agencies4 are recruiting 
workers in Bangladesh under the guidance 
and supervision of the BMET. However, a large 
number of migrant workers receive work permits 
through unofficial channels and migrate without 
the knowledge of/clearance by the BMET. Such 
“undocumented” workers are particularly more 
vulnerable to exploitation (Institute for Human 
Rights and Business & RMMRU, 2011).
In recent years, irregular labour migration from 
Bangladesh through private recruiting agents 
has diminished on a large scale. Affirmative 
intervention MEWOE and the BMET is one of the 
main reasons behind this encouraging outcome. 
However, the main challenges related to regular 
migration carried out through private recruiting 
agents and individual initiative still remain. One of 
the unethical practices in the recruitment process 
is high recruitment costs being imposed upon 
migrant workers. 
ILO and United Nations (UN) Conventions call 
for employers to shoulder the economic costs of 
migration.5  However, in reality, the labour broker 
system facilitates a situation where workers 
subsidize the cost of labour migration, not 
employers. A potential migrant may have to pay, 
on average, 10 times more to secure a job than 
an employer would have to pay to secure that 
same worker. “Charges borne by migrants include 
recruitment and selection (commitment/reservation 
fees; placement fees; direct costs); on-site 
conditions (deductions, runaway insurance, other 
deductions), and return/reintegration” (Institute of 
Human Rights and Business & RMMRU, 2011, p. 
3, citing research by Verité).
The high cost of recruitment and migration 
is also suspected to have a link with human 
trafficking, forced labour, debt bondage, and 
4 BMET, http://www.bmet.gov.bd/BMET/raHomeAction [accessed 
5 Aug. 2013].
5 ILO Private Employment Agencies Convention, 1997 (No. 
181), Article 7(1) states, “Private employment agencies shall not 
charge directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, any fees or costs 
to workers.”
loss of remittances. Inadequate opportunities for 
regular migration compel many potential migrants 
to make unfair deals with recruiting agencies, 
intermediaries, or individual brokers living in 
destination countries. Sometimes potential 
migrants enter into such arrangements without 
having an adequate understanding of the deal. 
Before they even begin their actual employment 
abroad, some migrant workers find themselves 
bonded by fees they have paid and the 
commitments they made to brokers. As workers 
progress through the recruitment process, they 
often face mounting debt. Since they incurred a 
huge amount of debt in Bangladesh, they find it 
impossible to go back and this, in turn, compels 
them to do anything they can in order to stay in the 
destination country. In addition to this unfavourable 
debt situation at home, migrant workers often find 
themselves in exploitative situation in the countries 
of destination (IHRB & RMMRU, 2011).
The cost of recruitment and migration is intricately 
bound-up with a number of factors. Some 
stakeholders in the migration process (such 
as recruiting agencies) tend to attribute high 
recruitment and migration costs to market-driven 
factors (i.e., the demand and supply of labour); 
others attribute high costs to the lack of adequate 
regulation in the recruitment sector. In truth, 
both factors have to be taken into consideration 
in making an analysis of international labour 
recruitment and migration cost. Moreover, it is 
necessary to understand the trends of migration 
to various countries, the specific immigration laws 
of each destination country, and the role of the 
relevant stakeholders in these processes. 
The situation being what it is, it is necessary 
to form an understanding of the international 
labour migration sector through the adoption of a 
comprehensive approach. Following a thorough 
consideration of the recruitment and migration 
costs incurred by migrant workers, appropriate 
regulatory system need to be put in place to guide 
and regulate recruitment for the international 
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labour market. There should be equal emphasis 
on implementation, periodic tripartite review for 
the purpose of updating the measures initiated in 
the system, and regular performance evaluations 
of those responsible for making the system work.
1.2 Study objectives
Bangladesh’s demographic dividend has flung open 
a window of opportunity for the national economy. 
Certain countries/regions with high economic 
growth are currently experiencing a decline in the 
size of their labour forces. Bangladesh has the 
capacity to meet the labour demands in these 
countries/regions. Although overseas employment 
and remittance expedite the economic development 
of Bangladesh, the actual and potential benefits/
prospects of labour migration on the national 
economy, migrants, and their households still remain 
largely an unexplored area. This being the case, the 
Government of Bangladesh, and the ILO with the 
concurrence of its two other constituents, namely, 
the workers and employers organizations, initiated 
five studies on migration and development issues 
in Bangladesh, under a project entitled “Promoting 
Decent Work through Improved Migration Policy 
and its Application in Bangladesh”. 
The objectives of this study, titled, “The Cost: 
Causes of and potential redress for high recruitment 
and migration costs in Bangladesh” are to: 
1. develop an understanding of the current 
state of policy and regulatory mechanisms 
related to recruitment and migration costs;
2. promote reform and regulation of the labour 
recruitment system as it currently exists in 
Bangladesh; and
3. promote regulations and mechanisms to 
control recruitment by promoting ethical 
recruitment and reduced migration costs.
1.3 Methodology
Considering the objectives of this study, literature 
review was determined to be the main method 
to be utilized. However, to address some specific 
objectives of the study, the study included primary 
data collection and analysis were done as part of 
the research process. Primary data and information 
were collected through interviews and focus group 
discussions, using separate diagnostic tools for 
different groups of respondents. 
Both quantitative and qualitative research 
approaches were adopted to address the objectives 
of the study. There were several rationales for utilizing 
a mixed method of qualitative and quantitative 
approaches. First of all, quantitative data and 
qualitative information have been triangulated as 
per the needs of the study objectives. The nature of 
the study demands the answer of “What”, “How”, 
and “Why” questions. It is very difficult to answer 
“How” and “Why” questions from a positivist 
ontological standpoint point.6  For instance, issues 
related to “better labour migration management 
procedure” and “causes of unethical labour 
recruitment practice” cannot be addressed through 
single reality perception. Different stakeholders in 
the process certainly have different orientations 
and explanations in connection with the same 
issue. Hence, qualitative data was given due 
consideration in the study.
Labour migration is a vast area of understanding 
and analysis for academics and researchers. 
Hence, a considerable number of theoretical 
understandings of the process are available in the 
academic and research domain. However, instead 
of focusing on a specific theoretical model, this 
study made its analysis on the basis of various 
policies, rules, guidelines, and conventions of 
government and intergovernmental bodies. 
6 Positivism refers to any philosophical system that confines 
itself to the data of experience, excludes a priori or metaphysical 
speculations, and emphasizes the achievements of science. 
Positivism is closely connected with empiricism, pragmatism, 
and logical positivism. Source: Merriam Webster Dictionary; 
Positivism: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/positivism 
[accessed 1 Aug. 2013]. The ontological tradition of positivism 
considers that only a single reality is out there which can be 
understood through an objective standpoint. This reality can 
be scientifically verified or is capable of logical or mathematical 
proof.
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The study adopted both inductive and deductive 
approaches of reasoning. Following the specific 
research question, specific strategies, tools, 
and techniques were used to gather primary 
information from field activity, on the one hand. 
On the other hand, existing secondary information 
was analyzed to understand the situation from 
different perspectives. Major strategies, tools, and 
techniques used under this study are as follows:
National workshop: A day-long workshop was 
held on 6 February 2013 in Dhaka, where various 
inputs came from key stakeholders, particularly the 
povernment, the recruitment agents’ association, 
and workers. 
Use of secondary data and information: The 
study used secondary data and information for 
analysis. Data from relevant povernment official 
databases and information from other widely 
accepted reports/articles were used for analysis 
and estimation. 
Focus group discussion (FGDs) with returning and 
returned migrant workers: Focus group discussions 
(FGDs) were organized with returning migrant 
workers. An FGD with male returning migrants was 
held in Tangail district on 10 March 2013. A separate 
FGD with returning migrant women workers was 
held in Munshiganj district on 18 April 2013. In the 
FGD with the men, nine returning migrants who had 
worked in Saudi Arabia, Libya, Malaysia, Singapore, 
and Iran participated. The men had been abroad 
for between three to 14 years, with the average 
length of stay being 7.1 years. In the FGD with the 
women, 15 returning migrants who worked in Saudi 
Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, Lebanon, and the United 
Arab Emirates participated. The women had been 
employed abroad for between two to 11 years, with 
the average length of stay being 5.2 years.
Key informant interviews: A number of key 
informant interviews were conducted during 
the study. The major key informants interviewed 
were from the following groups: officials of the 
BMET, representatives from the recruitment 
agents’ association BAIRA, recruiting agents, 
illegal sub-agents, NGOs working on migration 
issues, relevant journalists, and academics. Key 
informant interview were conducted in different 
phases between January and June 2013.
Survey: A small survey (not a statistically 
representative sample survey) was conducted on 
two groups of people – returning migrant workers 
and members of households with a migrant 
worker currently employed overseas (hereafter 
referred to as “migrant household members”) 
– in order to develop an understanding of the 
current status and supplement/validate the data 
and information contained in secondary sources. 
In-depth interviews with returning migrant 
workers and migrant household members were 
held in 14 districts across Bangladesh (Barisal, 
Bogra, Faridpur, Khulna, Kurigram, Kushtia, 
Moulavibazar, Munshiganj, Noakhali, Pabna, 
Patuakhali, Rangamti, Rangpur, and Tangail). 
In each of these 14 districts, an average of five 
returning migrants and five migrant household 
members were interviewed. A total of 67 returning 
migrants and 69 migrant households were 
interviewed in January and February 2013. The 
number of sample districts was derived simply to 
cover 20 per cent of the districts of Bangladesh. 
The districts were selected using probability 
proportional to size. Districts were selected from all 
seven of the Divisions of Bangladesh. The sample 
selection was purposive. 
All research ethics and the anonymity of 
respondents/participants were ensured during 
primary data collection. To protect the identity of 
research participants, the names of the participants 
were coded, using pseudo-names, and these 
pseudonyms are used in the study report.
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International labour migration from Bangladesh can 
be divided into two major categories: documented 
and undocumented. Documented labour migration 
refers to those migrations through regular channels 
which are documented in the BMET’s records. It is 
not guaranteed, however, that documented migrant 
workers remain documented forever. Migrants 
sometimes lose their documented status by staying 
in the destination country after the expiration of 
their job contract or changing their employer, or by 
subsequent migration through irregular channels to 
other countries. 
Undocumented labour migration refers to migrations 
through irregular channels which are not recorded 
by the BMET. Intended labour migrants may adopt 
devices like the use of student or tourist visas in 
order to go abroad. They then seek out employment 
in the overseas job market upon their arrival. 
Some undocumented migrants later do receive 
documented/regular status through amnesties or 
other actions taken by countries of destination, but 
the majority remain undocumented and irregular 
for the duration of their time overseas. From the 
focus group discussions, it seems that the majority 
of these undocumented labour migrations are 
through channels that involve trafficking in persons 
or human smuggling, as well as migration on a 
tourist visa.
International 
migration systems  
and procedures
C h a p t e r   2
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At the outset of the overseas labour migration 
process, potential migrants make their decision 
to go abroad on the basis of the incentives and 
disincentives of migration. In this connection, 
sources of information about countries of 
destination act as an important determinant in 
overall migration process. The survey and in-depth 
interviews with the migrant workers conducted for 
this study indicate that relatives and other illegal 
intermediaries are the two most common sources 
of information (55.5 and 45 per cent, respectively) 
from whom migrants got their initial perception 
about countries of destination, overseas jobs, 
costs, etc.1 This information has an effect on 
potential migrants’ decision-making processes. 
Migration and recruitment costs, the focus of this 
report, was cited by 14 per cent of migrant workers 
as being a major determining factor in selecting 
the country of destination and the means by which 
they would migrate there.
1 The survey question which was used to gather this information 
had the provision for multiple responses to be given by a single 
respondent.
Box 2.1: Major tasks of MEWOE that have a 
direct bearing on the rights of migrant workers
1) Ensuring welfare and protection of expatriates;
2) Addressing complaints of expatriates;
3) Mobilizing investment by the expatriates in the Bangladesh economy;
4) Ensuring inclusion and participation of expatriates in Bangladesh’s socio-economic development;
5) Regulation of recruitment agents;
6) Promoting overseas employment;
7) Supervising BMET, BOESL, Probashi Kallyan Bank, and any other subordinate organizations that may be 
formed by MEWOE in the future;
8) Coordination with the Bangladeshi foreign missions for the appointment of staff and deployment of 
resources required for the welfare and protection of the expatriates;
9) Management of the Wage Earners’ Welfare Fund;
10) Promotion of Bangladeshi culture among the expatriates;
11) Formulation of the drafts of laws and policies on issues under the charge of the MEWOE for adoption by 
designation institutions;
12) Engagement with international institutions on issues under the charge of the MEWOE; and
13) Qualitative and quantitative research on issues under the charge of the MEWOE.
A closer look at migration patterns on a district by 
district basis reveals differences in the migration 
routes workers adopt to reach destination 
countries. Migrant workers from Tangail district, 
for example, usually migrate through regular 
channels to Malaysia, while workers from Jessore 
district heading to Malaysia seem to opt for 
irregular channel, including traveling by boat.2 
The international labour migration procedures 
adopted by Bangladeshi workers – both regular 
and irregular – are concisely discussed in the 
following sections.
2.1 Systems and procedures for 
documented migration
Labour migration systems differ depending on the 
destination country. The majority of Bangladeshi 
migrant workers (72.7 per cent) head to the Middle 
East for overseas employment. About 22 per cent 
of Bangladeshi migrant chose other countries 
2 Findings of FGD (Male) carried out at Tangail district by the 
study team.
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in Asia (excluding Middle East countries). This 
leaves a relatively small percentage (4.2 per cent) 
who migrate to Europe, North America, Australia, 
and New Zealand. 
2.1.1 Institutions involved in the labour 
migration process
Before 2001, the Ministry of Labour and 
Employment was responsible for international 
labour migration. In 2001, the Ministry of 
Expatriates’ Welfare and Overseas Employment 
(MEWOE) was established by the government to 
dedicatedly work on international labour migration 
issues. The new ministry is entrusted with a range 
of responsibilities related to the Bangladeshi 
expatriates from pre-departure to return (the major 
functions of MEWOE are shown in Box 2.1).3
Two other government bodies operate under 
MEWOE, namely the Bureau of Manpower, 
Employment and Training  (BMET) and the 
Bangladesh Overseas Employment and Services 
Limited (BOESL).
Established in 1976 during the initial phase of 
labour migration from Bangladesh, the BMET is 
responsible for executing the plans and policies of 
MEWOE aimed at enhancing labour migration and 
training as well as protecting migrants’ welfare. 
These tasks also involve controlling and monitoring 
the activities of recruiting agencies.
BOESL is the only State-owned overseas 
employment company in Bangladesh. The 
institution is responsible for enhancing and 
processing all foreign employment demands from 
overseas governments or individuals. In addition, 
it promotes the employment of Bangladeshis in 
other countries. One of the main objectives of the 
institution is to minimize recruitment and migration 
cost through the provision of services for migrant 
workers under a “no profit, no loss” strategy.
3 T. De Bruyn and U. Kuddus: Dynamics of remittance utilization 
in Bangladesh, IOM Migration Research Series No. 18, 2005, p 
15.
Under the control and supervision of MEWOE and 
the BMET, 868 licensed international recruiting 
agents are operating in Bangladesh.4 These 
private agencies, on their own behalf, collect 
information on demand in overseas job markets 
and seek out orders for foreign employment. 
International recruiting agents have a national-
level association called the Bangladesh 
Association of International Recruiting Agencies 
(BAIRA). The objectives of BAIRA are to ensure 
the welfare of the migrant workforce as well as 
the interests of more than 900 member agents. 
 BAIRA works in collaboration with and with 
support from the Government of Bangladesh.
Apart from the above-mentioned institutions, 
intermediaries (dalals), social networks, and sub-
agents (located in both Bangladesh and countries of 
destination) play a vital role in the labour migration 
process of Bangladesh. As mentioned above, a 
considerable portion of migrant workers get their 
initial information about countries of destination, 
the migration process, and the relevant institutions 
from their social networks (e.g., family members, 
relatives, and friends). Moreover, they rely on 
their social capital to integrate into the country of 
destination. Potential migrants are more prone to 
rely on social networks or sub-agents rather than 
private recruiting agents.5 As dalals and illegal sub-
agents are not registered under any government 
or private institutions, it is very hard to estimate 
the total number of intermediaries operating in 
Bangladesh. However, a recent study (Siddiqui, 
2011) estimated that about 10,000 intermediaries 
were operating in Bangladesh.
4 Data derived from BMET website, http://www.bmet.gov.bd/
BMET/raHomeAction [accessed 5 Aug. 2013].
5 For more details on BAIRA, visit the association’s website, 
http://www.hrexport-baira.org/ [accessed 4 Apr. 2013]
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2.1.2 Migration procedure
The international labour recruitment and migration system in Bangladesh involve diverse and complex 
stages for migrant workers to go through. Several institutions are engaged in this process, including the 
Union Information and Service Center, the Rural Information Center, District Employment and Manpower 
Offices (DEMOs), local passport offices, training centre, recruiting agencies, banks, the BMET One Stop 
Service Desk, health examination centres, and so on. A simplified depiction of typical international labour 
migration process in Bangladesh is shown in Figure 2.1.
According to the ideal procedure for international 
labour migration, an overseas job seeker needs 
to get registered with the computer database  
network of the BMET. The potential migrant may 
6 Labour migration process for women as delineated in 
the website of Oparajitar Ovijatra. Oparajitar Ovijatra is a 
comprehensive database for potential women migrant workers 
in Bangladesh. The web portal is resourceful in terms of its 
graphical descriptions of the whole migration process. The web 
link is maintained under the website of Abolombon (an initiative 
of Dnet), http://www.abolombon.org/aparajita/find.html [accessed 
5 June 2013).
register their name and other particulars at any of 
the 42 District Employment and Manpower Offices 
(DEMOs) of the BMET or at the office of BAIRA. 
The application forms are available free of cost at 
the DEMOs and at branches of Sonali Bank.7 The 
forms can also be downloaded from the website of 
the BMET. The registration procedure is delineated 
in Figure 2.2 below.
7 A State-owned bank in Bangladesh.
Figure 2.1: Ideal official process of labour migration6
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Each registered candidate will be supplied with 
a registration ID card with a unique registration 
number. Registration is mandatory for all 
prospective overseas job seekers. Each job seeker 
can use this ID in future for any BMET services 
relating to overseas employment. The migrant 
worker computer database network was developed 
so that it could be accessed in/utilized by the 
following institutions:
n	 BMET main office;
n	 MEWOE;
n	 DEMOs;
n	 Sahajalal International Airport, Dhaka;
n	 Shah Amanat International Airport, 
Chittagong; and
n	 Osmani International Airport, Sylhet.
The employment contract is one of the most 
important components of labour migration. As per 
the Bangladesh Household Remittance Survey 
2009, from among all migrants using the regular 
migration channels, approximately 78.7 per cent 
received a contract of employment before they 
travelled to the country of their current residence. 
For 74.2 per cent migrants, it took six months to 
obtain the contract documents (IOM, 2010).
At present, potential migrant workers have the 
opportunity to secure overseas employment 
through following regular channels:
1. Recruiting agents;
2. Individual contacts (relatives/friends/own 
effort);
3. BMET and BOESL; and
4. Government-to-government arrangements.
In adopting a particular recruitment channel, 
migrant workers consider following factors:
n	 Trust and loyalty: During the migration 
process, potential migrants place trust in 
their surrounding social network. Social 
Figure 2.2: Registration procedure for potential migrant workers
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networks, by providing information on job 
opportunities, the procurement of work 
permits, and bona fide recruiting agents, 
may act as a key determinant in migrants 
choosing a particular recruitment 
channel. 
n	 Assurance of support at destination 
countries: Accommodation, transportation, 
and other necessary support services in 
destination countries are also considered 
by potential migrants in choosing a 
particular channel of migration. Hence, 
they want to make sure that trustworthy 
recruiting agents, illegal sub-agents, and 
other intermediaries such as friends and 
relatives, will make such arrangements. 
n	 Familiarity and proximity: Nearby recruiting 
agents or sub-agents get priority when 
potential migrants select their channel 
of migration. Some sub-agents who are 
engaged in dubious activity do not want 
to cheat their fellow villagers; instead, they 
prefer to sell problematic work permits 
elsewhere (Afsar, 2009).
Of course, whatever channel a migrant worker 
selects, the whole process of regular labour 
migration takes places under the direct authority of 
the government. Ideally, private recruiting agents 
simply facilitate the process under the guidance 
and control of the government.
According to the Bangladesh Household 
Remittance Survey 2009 (IOM, 2010), about 53 
per cent of migrant workers took on help from 
intermediaries, while 13 per cent migrated through 
private recruitment agents (Figure 2.3). However, 
the survey report assumes that many of the illegal 
intermediaries actually work for private recruitment 
agents. Therefore, the survey could not precisely 
indicate the proportion of migrant workers 
migrating through recruiting agents. However, an 
earlier report (IOM & RMMRU, 2002) indicated 
that 45 per cent of migrant workers arranged their 
employment abroad through recruiting agents 
(shown in Figure 2.4).
Irregularities in labour migration and recruitment 
channels differ from one destination country to 
another. Many recruitment agents and illegal 
intermediaries and sub-agents manipulate 
lacunae in the immigration systems to run irregular 
migration networks. For instance, key informant 
Figure 2.3: Recruitment facilitation between 1976 and 2009 (per cent)
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interviews suggested that Umrah visas for a pilgrimage to Ka’bah in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, have been 
misused to enter the country and stay on. There has been also instance of Umrah companies selling 
these visas through their agents outside Saudi Arabia. Different visa categories and recruitment channels 
for migrating to Gulf countries are delineated in Box 2.2.
Lack of information about the labour migration process is one cause for workers and their households 
becoming indebted and the worker becoming dependent on the recruitment agents. For example, the 
labour recruitment system to Saudi Arabia goes through specific phases depending on whether the 
worker is recruited through an individual or group visa. The steps are delineated in Figure 2.5 and Figure 
2.6 below. Saudi Arabia has the largest Bangladeshi diaspora and yet it is a destination characterized by 
risks. Semi-literate or functionally illiterate and low-skilled workers, who have heard of Saudi Arabia more 
than other countries, often fall victim to illegal intermediaries and sub-agents who exploit their economic 
and educational weaknesses. Recruitment agents tend to charge exorbitant fees for services that are 
delivered by government bodies free of cost. Workers, lacking information about the migration process, 
pay the high fees. 
Box 2.2: Visa categories and recruitment 
channels for migrating to Gulf countries
n Typically Bangladeshi migrants use two type of visa for documented migration to Gulf countries:
n Iqama or individual employment visa on the sponsorship of a Saudi company or citizen: This type of work 
permit and visa allows a worker to work in a pre-assigned job, and only in that pre-assigned job.
n Nominal sponsorship system: Also called a “free visa” by migrants, this type of visa is expensive but 
attractive to migrant workers, as they erroneously believe that this type of visa allows migrants to find 
their own job. However, in reality, sponsors control migrant workers’ income. This visa allows the holder 
to enter the country but does not allow them to work, and those workers who find employment, typically, 
are required to pay a monthly or other agreed upon sum to the nominal sponsor. This visa does not offer 
them protection under the labour laws or any form of social security.       
Figure 2.4: Channels through which migrants arranged their jobs 
abroad (1976–2000)
Source: IOM & RMMRU, 2002.
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Figure 2.5: Recruitment process for migrant workers heading to Saudi 
Arabia under a group visa8
Figure 2.6: Recruitment process for a migrant worker heading to 
Saudi Arabia under an individual visa9
..............................................................................................................................................................................................................
8  Source: Key informant interviews with BMET officials and representatives of BAIRA.
9  Source: Key informant interviews with BMET officials and representatives of BAIRA.
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2.1.3 Migration through recruiting 
agencies
Bangladeshi recruiting agents, working under a 
license from the MEWOE, are expected to collect 
information on labour demand in the overseas 
job market, immigration processes, and working 
and living conditions, and identify job placement 
opportunities. The recruiting agents may receive 
information about vacancies and a demand letter 
for placement of the workers from the concerned 
foreign employer directly or via overseas recruiting 
agencies contracted by the overseas employer. 
Bangladeshi recruiting agents operate largely 
through the recruiting agencies and sub-agents 
operating in the destination countries. Before a 
recruiting agent can act on the demand letter, the 
letter is required to be verified and approved by 
the labour wings of Bangladesh missions overseas. 
If there is no mission to authenticate the letter, 
satisfactory evidence of the authenticity of the 
document needs to be furnished by the recruiting 
agent to the BMET. 
After meeting all the requirements of the BMET and
MEWOE, recruiting agents recruit workers as per 
the skills requirements received from the employer 
or through the overseas recruiting agent. Currently, 
the MEWOE requires that a recruiting agent gives 
priority to those workers who are included in a 
database developed by the BMET and the DEMOs. 
This database has details of those workers who have 
expressed an interest in migrating for employment by 
filling in an online from. Every selected worker has to 
be issued an electronic smart card and clearance to 
migrate after the worker has fulfilled the mandatory 
pre-migration requirements, which sometimes are 
customized to meet specific conditions put forth by a 
country of destination. In general, the requirements 
to be met before clearance can be given include 
a review of all contract and migration documents, 
a health check, the opening of a bank account, 
fingerprinting and registration, and the reception of 
a smart card.
Role of sub-agents: As mentioned above (Figure 
2.3), about 53 per cent of migrant workers  
migrated through the use of illegal intermediaries 
or sub-agents. Prospective migrants tend to lack 
access to recruiting agents or government offices 
concerned with migration, and therefore rely 
instead on illegal sub-agents who live and work 
in their locality. Since prospective migrants at the 
community level remain under the influence of 
illegal sub-agents, recruiting agents are compelled 
to utilize sub-agents for worker recruitment.10 
According to recruiting agents, people in rural 
areas are so unwilling to place their trust in non-
local organizations that prospective migrants 
will work with local sub-agents even if the sub-
agents charge more than the recruiting agents 
(Afsar, 2009). However, it should be noted 
that under Bangladeshi law, workers must go 
through recruiting agents to migrant abroad, so 
just as recruiting agents need to work with illegal 
sub-agents, the illegal sub-agents must forge 
relationships with recruiting agents.
Illiteracy among migrant workers and a lack of 
knowledge about the type of occupations being 
offered and the countries of destination lead 
first-time migrant workers to rely on sub-agents. 
Individuals who migrate for a second time are 
less likely to make use of sub-agents, as they 
have become more aware about the migration 
process.11 Box 2.3 presents some individual 
cases that delineate the decision-making process 
with regard to selecting migration channel for 
employment in Malaysia. 
 
10 Finding of key informant interview with 
Mohammed Masud Parvez, Welfare Association of 
Repatriated Bangladeshi Employees (WARBE).
11  Revealed during FGD with male migrant workers in Tangail 
District.
10 Finding of key informant interview with 
l i i
i l i l
11  Revealed during FGD with male migrant workers in Tangail 
District.
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Box 2.3: Case studies: Decision-making, 
networking, and channels of migration
Abdur Rahim (pseudonym) has been working in Malaysia for 13 years. He knew many people from his area 
who had migrated successfully with help of a local illegal sub-agent who made him interested in going abroad. 
Moreover, since Rahim’s father was a respected and influential person in his locality, he was confident that 
he would not be cheated. The whole process took around three months and he had to spend BDT170,000 
to go Malaysia. Another participant of the FGD discussion, Sujon (pseudonym), told the study team that he 
initially was interested in migrating to Kuwait. In 1993, through a illegal sub-agent (dalal) in his district, he 
came to know about a worker recruitment announcement from Malaysia. Sujon was connected to a recruiting 
agent located in Dhaka through that illegal sub-agent. The main task of that illegal sub-agent was to gather 
interested people who were willing to go abroad and link them to the main recruiting agent. It took one 
year and a half for him to go abroad. Sujon’s elder brother Pronob (pseudonym) also migrated to Malaysia 
in 2007. For Pronob the migration process was hassle-free because his brother informed him about the 
migration process and requirements related to qualifications and legally valid documents. It required nearly 
six months for Pronob to complete the migration process. Since Pronob was well-informed, he also negotiated 
the recruitment and migration cost and incurred a total expenditure of BDT180,000, which is also high but 
lower than the amount his brother had to pay. 
Source: Reported during FGD held in Tangail district.
The role of illegal intermediaries or sub-agents in 
countries of destination and transit: The operation 
of overseas brokers/intermediaries and recruiting 
agents varies from one destination country to 
another. However, in general they play a crucial 
role in the recruitment and migration process. In 
Gulf countries, recruiting agents/brokers from India, 
Sri Lanka, and Pakistan have far more presence 
than those from other countries, like Bangladesh. 
Very few Bangladeshi recruiting agents have direct 
access to those markets. As a result, recruiting 
agents in Bangladesh have to rely on relationships 
with those overseas recruiting agents/brokers to 
secure demand letters or job offers. Although in 
some cases, Bangladeshi recruiting agents do 
make direct communication with employers. The 
movement of job offers among employers, recruiting 
agents, intermediaries, and employees is shown in 
Figure 2.7.
Recruiting agents in destination countries work 
under the regulations of that country. Commission-
based legal or illegal agents work on behalf of these 
overseas recruiting agencies. These sub-agents, 
acting in the manner of a door-to-door sales agents, 
visit employers to identify vacancies and offer the 
services of the recruitment agencies for whom 
they may be working. In many cases, overseas 
employers prefer to rely on recruiting agencies 
in their own country to share the legal liability 
of bringing a migrant worker into the country.12 
Sometimes, illegal intermediaries and/or recruiting 
agencies operating in a destination country also 
collude with employers who do not wish to bring 
workers through regular channels. Such a nexus 
leads to labour migration fraud that results in the 
exploitation of workers. In some Gulf countries in 
particular, employers sell visas (especially Kafeel, 
or sponsorship visas) to intermediaries (Martin, 
2009). The job offers purchased by intermediaries 
or recruiting agencies in the destination country are 
marked up by about 30 per cent before being sold 
to individuals or recruiters in Bangladesh (Martin, 
2009). The extent to which visas are traded through 
these channels has been made clear by statements 
from authorities in some destination countries. One 
Saudi minister has claimed that 70 per cent of the 
visas issued by Saudi Arabia are traded on the 
12 Findings of key informant Interview with a sub-agent located in 
Bangladesh.
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black market, while a minister of Bahrain termed 
such visa trading a “plague” (Siddiqui, 2011). 
Sometimes, in order to get a higher brokerage or 
payment, intermediaries and overseas recruiting 
agencies overstated to the recruitment agents in 
Bangladesh the remuneration entitlement that 
certain vacancies may carry.
Malpractice by intermediaries and recruiting 
agencies in destination countries is one of the 
reasons behind the high number of undocumented 
migrants in GCC countries. Many of these 
recruiting agencies in GCC countries are owned 
by settled migrants from Bangladesh, India, 
and Pakistan. Many of the intermediaries also 
happen to be settled migrants who do the work 
as a side business. These recruiting agents and 
intermediaries take part in visa trading and often 
compete among themselves to get placement 
orders from employers. These recruiting agencies 
then auction the visas or the demand letters 
among Bangladeshi recruiting agents. For 
instance, recruiting agencies or illegal sub-agents 
in Saudi Arabia buy visas from for 2,000–6,000 
Saudi Arabia Riyal (SAR) per visa from Saudi 
companies or individual employers and sell them 
to Bangladeshi a recruiting agent or illegal sub-
agent. The price of a visa varies by the nature of 
the job it is linked to, the duration of the contract, 
the types of entitlements, etc. Through this trade, 
sub-agents in Saudi Arabia earn a handsome profit 
(about SAR500–2,000 per visa). If a Bangladeshi 
recruiting agent buys the visa, that agent will 
then recruit workers through its own network of 
illegal sub-agents or invite applicants through 
advertisements. As per the rules, the recruiting 
agents are required to advertise the vacancies in 
a local newspaper. If an illegal sub-agent in Saudi 
Arabia wants to sell a visa to a specific individual 
in Bangladesh, that sub-agent may have to utilize 
the help of a recruiting agent in Bangladesh. 
Figure 2.7: Movement of job offers among employers, recruiting 
agents, illegal intermediaries or sub-agents, and employees
The cost
Causes of and redress related to the high recruitment and migration costs in Bangladesh
18
Otherwise, the Bangladeshi worker who directly 
buys a visa from an overseas illegal sub-agent may 
contact a Bangladeshi recruiting agent to assist 
them in completing all necessary steps involved 
in migration. 
Sometimes, the overseas recruiting agencies, 
acting in collusion with the employer or the 
recruiting agents in Bangladesh, create fake 
contracts for jobs that do not exist and/or are 
for companies that exist only on paper. Migrant 
workers arrive in the destination country after 
paying substantial fees to secure the employment, 
only to learn that they do not actually have a 
job waiting for them. As a result, many become 
undocumented migrants who accept what work 
they can find in the destination country (Martin, 
2009). 
As per the Government of Bangladesh Rule, no part 
of the labour migration process can be completed 
without the involvement of a licensed recruiting 
agent of Bangladesh or the designated government 
authority. 
2.1.4 Migration through individual 
contacts
A considerable portion of migrant workers migrate 
using individual contacts. Key informants and 
migrant workers as well as secondary literature 
differ about the percentages with regard to workers 
who migrate on their own using the regular channel, 
workers who use illegal intermediaries or sub-agents 
to migrate through irregular channels, workers 
who migrate through registered recruiting agents, 
and workers who migrate through public sector 
recruitment initiatives. For example, one study 
(Siddiqui, 2005) suggests that about 55–60 per 
cent of labour migration is dependent on individual 
initiatives and social networks. What seems clear 
is that the variety and complexity of channels 
also add to the lack of clarity about recruitment 
and migration costs. The expense incurred by 
migrants through migration on their own is less 
than the expense incurred through the use of 
registered recruiting agents (Siddiqui, 2005). But 
in most instances, migration on one’s own with the 
assistance of relatives and friends is also dependent 
on the purchase of employment visas or bribes, 
which keeps the cost high, although not as high as it 
would be if fully dependent on illegal intermediaries 
or sub-agents and registered recruiting agents (see 
Box 2.3). Further, because Bangladesh law requires 
all low to skilled workers (i.e., all non-professional 
workers) to migrate for overseas employment 
after registering with the BMET, discussions with 
workers suggest that those workers who obtained 
job contracts through unscrupulous means often 
approach recruiting agents to get their job contracts 
validated and to process them for migration. Those 
recruiting agents who engage in such practices, 
charge a commission for this service. It would be 
fair to suggest that investigation is needed into this 
form of labour migration and more data needs to be 
collected and specific tools developed to detect and 
plug the gaps in labour migration through individual 
contacts. 
2.1.5 Migration through BMET and 
BOESL
Recruitment through the BOESL has never 
been in significant numbers. However, in recent 
years, the government has been making efforts 
to revitalize the BOESL. The BMET is not a 
recruiting organization; rather, it issues licences to 
private recruiting agents to conduct recruitment. 
However, in addition to its original function, the 
BMET has been asked by the MEWOE to recruit for 
government-to-government migration to Malaysia. 
Set up in 1984, BOESL is now a subordinate 
organization of the MEWOE and a state-owned 
limited company charged with recruiting workers 
for the international labour market. Up through the 
2011–12 financial year, a total of 31,149 migrant 
workers have gone abroad through BOESL. Figure 
2.8 delineates the distribution of these migrant 
workers by country of destination.13 In recent 
13 Figures derived from BOESL website, http://www.boesl.org.bd/
StatOtherCountries.aspx [accessed 7 Aug. 2013].
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years, BOESL has been getting priority attention 
from both the Government of Bangladesh and 
the governments of several destination countries 
as a channel for the sending of migrant workers. 
The Government of Bangladesh considers BOESL 
an instrument for market intervention and cost 
reduction in migration. 
In 2013, the Government of Bahrain stated that 
it wants to recruit Bangladeshi workers under 
State arrangements to curb the use of middlemen, 
and thereby better ensure a lower recruitment 
and migration cost and worker safety. Because 
of concerns over current migration practices, 
Bahrain does not want to utilize private recruiting 
agencies to hire workers from Bangladesh, instead 
preferring to deal with a single government agent 
(Ara, 2013). 
Under a 2006 Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) between Bangladesh and the Republic of 
Korea, BOESL is sending migrant workers to the 
Republic of Korea. The labour migration system 
between BOESL and Korean employers has 
been developed under the Republic of Korea’s 
Employment Permit System (EPS). Before the 
EPS, four Bangladeshi recruiting agents recruited 
the workers for Korean employers. During that 
time, the cost of recruitment and migration to 
the Republic of Korea was about BDT800,000 
to BDT1.1 million. The Korean EPS presents a 
comprehensive approach to managing migration 
and is an excellent example of a labour migration 
corridor in which migrant workers receive full 
protection under the Korean labour law. Four 
compulsory insurance plans cover expenses, such 
as a worker’s return airfare and injury or death not 
necessarily related to work (ILO, 2010). 
A typical recruitment process followed by BOESL 
is shown in Figure 2.9 below.
Figure 2.8: Distribution of migrant workers who have migrated 
through BOESL by country of destination
Source: BOESL website.
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2.1.6 Under government-to-government 
initiatives
Under an MoU signed between Bangladesh and 
Malaysia on 26 November 2012, the Bangladesh 
Government has started a formal process of sending 
workers to Malaysia. Under this government-to-
government arrangement, MEWOE produced 
advertisements for initial online registration by 
potential migrant workers interested in emigrating 
to Malaysia. This campaign led to 1.45 million 
people registering via the internet by April 2013.14 
As of November 2013, 3,400 workers have already 
taken up jobs in Malaysia under this MoU. Through 
this MoU, the Government of Malaysia not only re-
opened its labour market after a five-year ban on 
the recruitment of Bangladeshi workers but also 
helped establish that it is possible to reduce the 
cost of migration. Under the MoU, migration from 
14  BMET Online registration statistics system. Data made 
available on request.
Figure 2.9: The typical recruitment process followed by BOESL for 
recruiting workers for employment in Jordan
Bangladesh to Malaysia costs just BDT40,000, 
much less than the BDT200,000 to BDT300,000 
previously charged by private recruiting agents 
(Wickramasekara, 2013). 
The Government of Bangladesh has also 
announced a similar plan for Hong Kong (China). 
A group of 20 domestic workers who qualified at 
the end of a two-month vocational and language 
training have taken up jobs in Hong Kong (China). 
It is expected that Bangladesh would supply about 
170 to 200 workers per month.  These workers 
received a loan from the Probashi Kallyan Bank 
to pay for the cost of migration and initial living 
expenses in Hong Kong (China).
However, the use of a government-to-government 
approach to labour migration is a new experience 
for the Government of Bangladesh, and government 
officials acknowledge that the process is not without 
flaws. Nonetheless, the process is now on the way 
Source: Martin (2009).
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Figure 2.10: Government-to-government migration process developed 
for labour recruitment to Malaysia
and its ability to amend the flaws and become more effective as implementation continues would help 
institutionalization of the government-to-government approach to labour migration. The process of labour 
migration under the government-to-government initiative between Bangladesh and Malaysia is delineated 
in Figure 2.10 below:
2.2 Undocumented labour migration 
systems and procedures
Bangladesh being a heavily populated country 
with inadequate job opportunities, migration does 
not always follow regular procedures. A systematic 
irregular migration process has been developed in 
the country. This study collected some facts about 
irregular migration from television, online, and 
newspaper news reports.
Although others exist, three routes for irregular 
migration are particularly prominent in Bangladesh: 
(1) Irregular migration to Malaysia through sea 
routes (by boat); (2) Irregular migration to other 
South Asian countries like India, Pakistan, and 
the Maldives; and (3) Migration to Middle Eastern 
countries through the use of non-work visas (e.g., 
Umrah visa) with the migrant then taking up 
employment as an undocumented worker.
At the end of November and the first week of 
December 2012, a number of news reports 
about trafficking in persons from Bangladesh to 
Malaysia came to light. Television reports revealed 
the human trafficking scenario in a village named 
Saha Porir Dip in Cox’s Bazar district. Reports 
revealed that every year many people use the 
village as exit point for undocumented migration 
to Malaysia. On their journey to Malaysia, about 
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60 to 70 people hide within a wooden fishing boat. 
On deck a few people (two to four persons) act 
like professional fishers and navigate the boat to 
the destination in Malaysia. Aside from the fact 
that these boats made of wood- are fraught with 
danger and expose those on board to potentially 
deadly risks.
In Bangladesh, sea routes from Chittagong and 
Cox’s Bazar are used throughout the year for 
irregular migration via boats. This year-round 
transport occurs despite the fact that these routes 
are relatively safe only from November to January, 
when the Bay of Bengal remains relatively calm. 
Sea routes are a recourse for the desperate, such 
as refugees and the poorest, and are sometimes 
undertaken knowing the dangers. The traffickers 
and human smugglers who operate these boats 
charge less money than those who engage in 
irregular migration via air travel. It is also alleged 
that traffickers and smugglers sometimes fund the 
workers’ boat journeys in return for servitude for a 
certain time. 
The route is risky not only due to potentially 
dangerous seas but also because of monitoring 
by the coast guards of various countries (see Box 
2.4). Traffickers always try to avoid coast guard 
patrols. In case of a sudden search by coast 
guards, traffickers and smugglers sometimes try 
to bribe their way out of trouble. Often the boats 
and occupants get captured. It has been alleged 
in the focus group discussions that traffickers and 
smugglers, in some instances, have intentionally 
sunk their boats, perhaps carrying 60 to 70 people, 
to avoid capture by the authorities. 
Box 2.4: A painful event caused by irregular 
migration
It is said that the ban on recruitment of workers from Bangladesh by the Government of Malaysia did not deter 
the traffickers and smugglers. Many believe that in addition to the existing high cost of migration that was 
pushing poorer workers to take a boat to Malaysia, the ban also ended up giving more business to traffickers 
and smugglers. 
On 4 February 2013, a number of national and international news media reported that the Sri Lankan Navy 
rescued 138 Bangladeshi and Myanmar nationals on 2 February 2013 from a sinking wooden boat located 50 
miles off the island’s eastern coast. Of the 138 on board, 127 were Bangladeshis and the rest were Myanmar 
nationals who had previously crossed borders into Bangladesh. 
News reports claimed that the persons being smuggled paid BDT20,000 each to the smuggler to reach 
Malaysia. This sum is lower than even the government-to-government based migration cost and is far lower 
than the amount that was charged by recruiting agents in the past. The boat set off on 12 January 2013 from 
Nayapara in the Cox’s Bazar district of Bangladesh. After 10 days of journeying, the boat entered Thai waters, 
where it was captured by the Thai Navy. The occupants of the boat were kept under arrest for two days on the 
same boat. But somehow the boat, now without fuel, drifted into the open sea, and after 10 days reached Sri 
Lankan waters. Local fishers who saw this boat alerted the Sri Lankan Department of Fisheries and Aquatic 
Resources, who in turn informed the Sri Lankan Navy. After a 20-hour rescue mission, the occupants of the 
boat were rescued. By then one person was dead and many others unconscious due to hunger and dehydration. 
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These fishing boats carrying irregular migrants 
will make multiple stops on their way to Malaysia. 
Sometimes, the payment to the traffickers/
smugglers is made up front. Most times, the 
traffickers/smugglers reach an agreement with a 
migrant’s family for payment in tranches. Each 
tranche is tied to arrival at a particular transit point. 
Figure 2.11: Activity chain in the process of irregular migration to 
Malaysia through sea routes
At each transit point, the agent of the traffickers/
smugglers makes a phone call to the family of 
the migrant to make the migrants tell their family 
to pay the pre-determined fee to the traffickers/
smugglers. The process of this undocumented 
migration by sea route has been explained in 
Figure 2.11.
According to traffickers/smugglers both travellers 
and their families are informed about risk factors.15 
15  Key informant interview with a journalist.
There are two other reasons why extremely poor 
workers find this more risky route preferable to 
migrating through official channels. First, the 
process requires fewer vocational or technical 
qualifications, which are required as per the 
official procedures. Second, since the payment 
is usually made in tranches, if the workers 
cannot reach Malaysia but make it to Thailand 
instead, the cost comes to just BDT10,000 to 
a maximum of BDT35,000, which is very low 
compared to the cost incurred by going through 
regular channels. 
In the irregular migration process from Bangladesh, 
the involvement of foreign nationals is also notable. 
On October 2012, for example, Bangladesh police 
arrested three Libyan nationals with 684 fake 
Bangladeshi passports. The persons arrested 
are reported to have told the police that they had 
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been trafficking human beings from Bangladesh 
to Libya.16
The Umrah visa is often abused for irregular 
migration to Saudi Arabia. Although this type of 
visa does not permit a migrant to work, migrant 
workers get involved in undocumented work with 
the assistance of their social networks (Afsar, 
2009). There is an allegation that the use of tourist 
visa enables certain migrants to enter Malaysia, 
whereupon they utilize bribery in the event that they 
are questioned by police or immigration officials. 
There is also evidence that some migrant workers 
received visas and migrated to a specific country 
through an illegal sub-agent, and then later, they 
migrated once more to their target country (e.g., 
Libya) through an irregular channel.17
Undocumented migration to India from 
Bangladesh has also becoming a major concern in 
recent years. For some undocumented migrants, 
India is the country of destination; while others 
move through India in transit to Pakistan, the 
Maldives, and other countries. 
16 The Daily Prime News. 2012. “3 Libyans, Bangladeshi detained with 684 fake passports”, 24 Oct. Available at: http://www.dailyprime-
news.com/details.php?id=2136#sthash.hpZYRvxO.dpuf [5 Aug. 2013].
17  Findings of key informant interview with a sub-agent.
The cost
Causes of and redress related to the high recruitment and migration costs in Bangladesh
25
Cost                    
of recruitment 
and migration
C h a p t e r   3
3.1 Current cost structure of migration
In a country like Bangladesh, both push factors and 
pull factors have influence over peoples’ decision-
making process with regard to international labour 
migration. More lucrative wage abroad entice 
people to migrate, while the unfavourable status 
of the domestic job market further encourages 
people to look for possible employment overseas. 
The power of these factors can be such that 
some people become desperate migrate overseas 
for work and are willing invest their last coin for 
this purpose. In considering the cost structure 
of migration in Bangladesh, however, we must 
not only engage in a simple financial cost-benefit 
analysis but also take a human rights-based 
perspective. 
International labour migration has economic, 
social, and political costs that are generally shared 
between employers and migrants (Martin, 2010). 
This section of this study focuses on economic 
costs, such as the costs of information, documents, 
health checks, and other fees involved when 
workers move from Bangladesh to countries of 
destination. 
The cost of overseas migration from Bangladesh is 
considered to be among the most expensive in the 
world. These burdensome costs pose challenges 
for realizing the positive development impacts 
of international migration and for protecting the 
migrant workers who channel that positive impact 
to both Bangladesh and their own households. 
High recruitment and migration costs result in a 
loss of income among low-wage migrant workers 
and possibly a reduction in remittance flow.
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3.1.1 Ideal cost structure of migration
The cost structure of migration differs from one 
destination country to another. It also differs 
depending on the skill of the migrant worker, 
the type of work, the salary structure, and so 
on. Moreover, cost of recruitment and migration 
fluctuates due to market factors like demand 
and supply of labour. Therefore, it is difficult 
to assign any one particular cost structure of 
migration.
The Government of Bangladesh has not yet 
assigned any official cost structure of migration 
to recruiting agents. However, for each specific 
destination country, the government has fixed 
a maximum cost that a recruiting agent can 
charge to potential migrants. For instance, the 
government had previously set the recruitment and 
migration cost at BDT84,000 for labour migration 
to Malaysia (Afsar, 2009). This, of course, was 
before the 2012 government-to-government MoU 
was signed between the two countries. However, 
the ideal situation as specified in international 
Labour Conventions, recruitment and placement 
of migrant workers should not result in any costs 
being incurred by the migrant workers themselves.1 
As implied above, this is not the case at present in 
Bangladesh.
It is very difficult to generalize the types of cost 
that a typical migrant gets exposed to during 
their migration phase. However, Inter ministerial 
Subcommittees and BAIRA proposed probable 
breakdowns of the types of labour recruitment 
and migration costs on would face in migrating to 
some Middle East countries. The breakdown as 
proposed by BAIRA is shown in Table 3.1.
1 ILO Migration for Employment (Revised) Convention, 1949 
(No.  97) states that- “Each Member for which this Annex is in 
force undertakes to ensure that the services rendered by its 
public employment service in connection with the recruitment, 
introduction or placing of migrants for employment are rendered 
free.” (Annex -1, Article 4).
Table 3.1: Breakdown of cost-incurring aspects of migration in origin and destination countries as 
proposed by BAIRA 
Location Proposed type of costs 
In the country of
destination
BAIRA:
n	Application fees per visa
n	Work permit and medical fees
n	Intermediaries (where applicable)
By Inter Ministerial By Subcommittees:
n	Overseas Marketing and Liaison Office cost
n	Training
In Bangladesh
n	Air fare
n	Advanced income tax
n	Trade testing (for skilled workers) training and language
n	Welfare fund 
n	Data registration fee
n	Medical check up
n	Recruiting agency service charge
n	Others (entertainment, transport, hotel)
n	Insurance 
n	Visa fees (e.g., Saudi Embassy)
Source: Siddiqui (2011).
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At present the BMET is offering online registration 
for all workers, including women workers. The 
timing of online registration for specific destinations 
that have placed requests for women workers, 
like Hong Kong (China), Singapore, and Jordan, 
is announced in the local newspapers. According 
to such BMET announcements, the following cost 
of recruitment and migration are to be borne by 
selected women workers:
n	 If the employer does not pay for the airfare, 
the employee will pay the airfare.
n	 The cost of medical check-ups, 
contributions to the Wage Earner’s 
Welfare Fund, visa fees, service charges, 
orientation training, etc. The total cost to 
be borne by the worker will not exceed 
BDT20,000.2
n	 The worker may take a loan from the 
Probashi Kallyan Bank3 to meet the cost 
of the air travel and initial living expenses.
3.1.1.1 Recruitment and migration cost if migrating 
for work through the BOESL
As a government institution, BOESL charges 
the minimum possible fee (as it works on a no 
profit, no loss basis) to the workers for its logistic 
support and assistance. BOESL does not take 
service charges from potential migrants; rather, 
it gets commissions from employers that range 
between US$200 and $500, depending on the 
occupation and the level of skill required. It can 
be inferred, therefore, that the service charges of 
private recruiting agents that go beyond the fees 
charged by BOESL is solely for the profit of the 
private recruiting agents. Table 3.2 describes the 
fee structure that BOESL charges to the workers 
for its logistic support and assistance.
2 Derived from notice posted online by BMET: http://www.bmet.
gov.bd/BMET/resources/notice/2047.pdf [accessed 23 Apr. 
2013].
3 A state-owned specialized bank targeting prospective, current, 
and returning migrant workers.
Table 3.2: Service charges for migrants as 
demanded by BOESL (in BDT with US$ equivalent)
Categories
In cases where Air 
fare is paid by the 
employer 
In cases where 
air fare paid by 
the worker 
Semi-skilled 25 000 ($324) 17 000 ($220)
Skilled 35 000 ($454) 25 000 ($324)
Professional 60 000 ($779) 50 000 ($649)
Source: BOESL, http://www.boesl.org.bd/ServiceCharge.aspx 
[accessed 17 Apr. 2013]
To understand the typical breakdown of costs 
incurred by potential migrants who go through 
BOESL, Table 3.3 below presents a case study 
showing the charges levied by BOESL for a female 
garment worker position in Jordan.
Table 3.3: Typical cost structure followed by BOESL 
for international labour migration (in BDT)
Case: Job opportunity for female garments workers in 
Jordan (Position: machine operator; Contract period: 
Three years) (Notice no.1444/2013; Date: 4 August 
2013)
Sl. Cost Type Cost 
1
Service charge (will be 
refunded by employer to 
employee after four months)
10 000
2 Emigration Tax
14 900
3 Value Added Tax (VAT) 15%
4 BOESL registration fee
5 Wage earners’ welfare fee
6
Collateral fee (will be 
refunded by BOESL to 
employee after four months)
10 000
7
Air fare (will be borne by 
employer)
-
Total
34 900
(14 900 if one 
excludes the 
refundable 
charges)
Source: BOESL, http://www.boesl.org.bd/UploadedDocument/
NoticeboaedAttachments/207.pdf [accessed 7 Aug. 2013].
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Under a government-to-government arrangement, 
BOESL is engaged in sending workers to the 
Republic of Korea at a recruitment and migration 
cost of BDT56,000, including airfare (MEWOE, 
2012).
3.1.1.2 Regular recruitment costs using private 
recruiting agents
The Government of Bangladesh does attempt 
to regulate the amount potential migrants 
are charged by private recruiting agents. But 
considering that market-driven factors have an 
impact on cost determination, it has been hard to 
firmly fix the cost structure of overseas migration. 
Variations in rules and regulation across countries 
of destination make it additionally problematic to 
present a fixed, standard cost of recruitment and 
migration. Nonetheless, the cost involved in each 
step of regular recruitment and migration can be 
clearly identified and determined on a country 
by country basis. Some flexibility should be there 
to accommodate fluctuations in the cost of air 
tickets. The BMET has brought out recruitment 
and migration costs for recruitment and migration 
to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Oman, and 
Singapore. The cost breakdown provided by the 
BMET is given below in Table 3.4. It must be noted 
that the hidden costs that increase the actual 
costs incurred by migrant workers are related to 
irregularities and exploitative practices associated 
with regular migration.
Table 3.4: Breakdown of cost structure for labour migration to the UAE, Oman, and Singapore (in BDT) as 
determined by the Government of Bangladesh
Cost under 
major heads
Male
UAE Oman Singapore
Female Male Female Male Female Male
1 Application fee 180 180 180 180 180 180
2 Air ticket 30 000 30 000 28 000 28 000 30 300 30 300
3 Medical test 5 500 5 500 5 500 5 500 3 000 3 000
4 Service charge 8 000 8 000 8 000 8 000 12 000 12 000
5 Insurance 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 - -
Total cost 44 680 44 680 42 680 42 680 45 480 45 480
Source: Key informant interview with BMET officials.
3.1.1.3 Recruitment and migration costs under the government-to-government initiative between 
Bangladesh and Malaysia
Under the current arrangement between the governments of Bangladesh and Malaysia, Bangladeshi 
workers need to pay just BDT33,178 to migrate to Malaysia for employment (The Daily Star, 2013). 
However, costs may vary subject to fluctuations in air fare prices. For instance, the government initially 
fixed the cost of migration to Bangladesh at BDT40,000, but due to air fare reductions, the total actual 
recruitment and migration cost ended up being lower for that initial group of individuals who migrated 
under the new arrangement. Following the initial circular of the BMET, Table 3.5 gives a breakdown of 
the costs associated with migration to Malaysia through the government-to-government arrangement.
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Table 3.5: Breakdown of recruitment and migration costs (in BDT) under the government-to-government 
arrangement with Malaysia
Sl. Type of cost Expenses
1. Air fare (one way) (subject to variation) 31 500
2. Medical examination 3 500
3. Welfare fee 250
4. Non-judicial stamp 300
5. Visa fee 1 100
6. Service charges 2 000
7. Income Tax 200
8. Orientation training 1 000
9. Miscellaneous 150
Total 40 000*
* First batch of migrants under this process had to pay just BDT33,178 due reductions in air fare.
Source: BMET, http://www.bmet.gov.bd/BMET/resources/notice/2050.pdf [accessed 20 July 2013].
The Government of Bangladesh has also announced recruitment procedures for migration to Hong Kong, 
China. Under the tentative arrangement, migrant workers will need to pay only air fare (approximately 
BDT40,000). This air fare cost will not be collected from the workers prior to their departure for Hong 
Kong (China). When they take up their employment, the fare will be deducted from their salaries over the 
first few months. 
Box 3.1: Methodological note
In delineating the cost structures as revealed by the Bangladesh Household Remittance Survey 2009 (IOM, 
2010), some re-estimation has been carried out. The Bangladesh Household Remittance Survey 2009 was 
conducted in 2009. To estimate costs at current prices, adjustments were made using the Consumer Price 
Index issued by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics. Total inflation between FY 2008/09 and February 2013 
is estimated as 40.96 per cent. The researchers used this inflation rate to adjust the estimates of Bangladesh 
Household Remittance Survey 2009 to bring them into line with February 2013 prices.
3.1.2 Actual cost of recruitment and migration4
Several research initiatives and surveys have been carried out by different institutions to delineate the 
actual cost of overseas migration from Bangladesh. Although these studies have been conducted at 
different time periods, comparison among them can be made to infer a generalize cost structure of 
migration. Among those surveys, the Bangladesh Household Remittance Survey 2009 (IOM, 2010) 
offers recently captured data about the cost structure of labour migration from Bangladesh. 
4  Authors of this study acknowledge with gratitude The Bangladesh Household Remittance Survey (2009): Summary Report of the IOM 
(2010), from which much of the data for this section has been drawn. The statistics found in pages 38-42 of that publication were of 
key import to this study.
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Using data from the Bangladesh Household Remittance Survey 2009, it can be estimated that the 
average Bangladeshi migrant (disregarding the specific country of destination) spends BDT309,259 
for their migration (figure is an estimate of the February 2013 price, see Box 3.1). However, the cost of 
recruitment and migration for a female migrant is substantially less than that of a male migrant. While 
women migrants on average spend BDT188,273, male migrants on average spend BDT311,301. 
Disregarding the gender dimension of recruitment and migration cost, about 42 per cent of all 
migrants spend between BDT281,921 to BDT422,880, which is quite a lot of money in the context of 
Bangladesh. The details of gender-segregated cost structures of recruitment and migration are shown 
in Table 3.6.
Table 3.6: Cost of recruitment and migration by gender 
Recruitment and migration cost5 
(in BDT)
Male (Per cent) Female (Per cent) All (Per cent)
70,480 2.9 13.2 3.1
70,481-140,960 9.2 44.1 9.8
140,961-281,920 33.4 23.5 33.3
281,921-422,880 42.3 9.3 41.8
422,881-563,840 6.7 2.5 6.6
563,840+ 3.8 3.9 3.8
Cost borne by others 1.6 3.4 1.6
Total 100 100 100
Mean cost of recruitment and 
migration
311 301.27 188 272.83 309 259.16
Source: IOM, 2010, p. 39.
5  Figures are estimates derived by adjusting the figures in IOM (2010) for inflationary increases between the survey period (FY 2008 – 09) 
and February 2013.
Figure 3.1: Average per capita cost of recruitment and migration 
by region of destination (in BDT)
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Cost of recruitment and migration varies across destination regions. Migrants who went to Middle 
Eastern countries on an average spend BDT281,700. The average recruitment and migration cost 
for other Asian countries (e.g., Malaysia and Singapore) is BDT321,530. As shown in Figure 3.1, 
the highest cost is incurred by migration to European countries. As before, these figures are inflation 
adjusted to February 2013 from the data presented in IOM, 2010.
Figure 3.2:  Average per capita cost of recruitment and migation by 
selected country of destination (in BDT)
The numbers shown in Figure 3.2 imply that the cost of recruitment and migration from Bangladesh 
is quite high, especially considering the economic condition of the migrant workers/potential migrant 
workers. It also can be surmised that the ideal cost structures suggested by the government are not 
followed during the migration process. Under an ideal migration process, migrant workers are not 
supposed to pay any commission to recruiting agents for getting a job abroad; rather the recruiting 
agent should get their commission from the employer. In fact, air fare for the potential migrant 
worker is supposed to be managed by the employer. In this connection, it is essential to explore 
what factors have led to these exorbitant recruitment and migration costs.
Recruitment and migration cost varies over time. A key informant interview with an illegal sub-
agent revealed the following cost estimates (as of June 2013) for migration by a Bangladeshi 
worker through irregular channel, as depicted in Table 3.7. The table also depicts the extent 
to which these prices exceed the BDT 84,000 cap on migration costs imposed by the 
government.
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Table 3.7: Approximate cost (in BDT) of recruitment and migration through illegal intermediary channels by 
destination country
Destination country
Cost range* of migration 
(as of June 2013)
Excess cost**
Qatar 350 000 266 000
Saudi Arabia 650 000 – 750 000 566 000 – 666 000
Lebanon 550 000 – 600 000 466 000 – 516 000
Oman 220 000 – 250 000 136 000 – 166 000
Libya 250 000 – 320 000 166 000 – 236 000
Malaysia 250 000 – 300 000 166 000 – 216 000
* Cost is subject to skill requirement, nature of job, salary, and other benefits.
**Considering the maximum cost ceiling (BDT84,000) fixed by the government.
Source: Key informant interview with an illegal sub-agent.
International labour recruitment and migration 
costs, as discussed above, are extremely volatile 
and subject to market forces in destination 
countries. At present, the labour markets of Saudi 
Arabia and Lebanon are relatively less open 
for Bangladeshi workers. Therefore, the cost of 
recruitment and migration to those countries has 
escalated over the last few years. In fact, recruiting 
agents, illegal sub-agents, and intermediaries 
also adjust their charges on the basis of their 
comparative advantages in accessing a certain 
market. With so many variables at play, it is difficult 
to generalize about the specific costs that migrant 
workers incur through the use of recruiting agents, 
illegal sub-agents and intermediaries. 
But there are specific scenarios for which more 
information is available. For example, in the case 
of migration to Saudi Arabia, recruiting agents 
or illegal sub-agents in Bangladesh manage to 
secure visas by purchasing them from sub-agents/
migrant workers in Saudi Arabia. These sub-agents 
in Saudi Arabia often are people who themselves 
arrived in that country as migrant workers. Having 
established themselves, they trade in visas and act 
as intermediaries as a secondary business. They 
buy visas from Saudi businesses/employers for 
between BDT42,600 to BDT127,800 (considering 
the currency conversion rate on 17 August 2013 
of SAR1.00 = BDT21.30). They then sell these 
visas to potential migrants in Bangladesh directly 
or to illegal sub-agents and recruiting agents in 
Bangladesh. In this process, the illegal sub-agents 
in Saudi Arabia make a profit of about BDT10,650 
to BDT42,600 per permit (Afsar, 2009). In key 
informant interviews for this study, recruiting 
agents and illegal sub-agents in Bangladesh 
did not disclose their total share in recruitment 
and migration cost. However, they admitted that 
intermediaries in Bangladesh tend to make a 
profit of about BDT30,000 to BDT50,000 per 
Saudi visa. One illegal sub-agent told the study 
team that when determining the recruitment and 
migration charge for a migrant worker, illegal 
sub-agents consider following additional costs 
and risk factors: the processing fee of recruiting 
agents (about BDT7,500), bribes (e.g., for local 
police), and additional time-cost that they incur 
pursuing government officials for passport, visa, 
and migration clearance. As per the rules, the 
BMET and labour attachés are required to verify 
the authenticity of the job offer, various migration 
documents, etc. Due to the shortage of staff 
in some of the missions and at the BMET, the 
verification and migration clearance processes 
often take a long time. 
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3.2 Points of exploitation and extortion
Throughout the migration process, migrants 
can potentially be exposed to exploitation and 
extortion in both the countries of origin and 
destination. In Bangladesh, migrants are often 
caught up in an exploitative process, marked 
by high cost of migration and various forms of 
harassment brought by intermediaries, recruiting 
agents, and moneylenders. Upon arrival in 
destination countries, they may encounter new 
forms of exploitation that are actually the legacy 
of exploitation that started in Bangladesh. For 
instance, a considerable portion of migrants do not 
get the specific job or salary they were promised 
prior to their arrival at the country of destination.
Apart from recruitment and migration cost, many 
potential migrant workers face harassment of 
some form in Bangladesh. About 23 per cent of 
migrant workers faced multiple problems while 
being processed for migration. Delays in visa 
delivery, demands of additional money, violations 
of contracts, and prolonged waiting times 
following the handover of money are the major 
problems befalling potential migrants. Among 
these problems, the most commonly experienced 
(20 per cent of migrants) is the prolonged waiting 
period for paperwork to be processed – a wait that 
is particularly problematic because the potential 
migrant has already paid money, money that may 
be in short supply in their household (IOM, 2010).
Box 3.2: Expensive source of financing 
migration: A case study
Md. Hassan (pseudonym), a resident of Noakhali district, migrated to Oman as a gardener of a date garden 
in 2007. He had to spend a total of BDT194,600 for migration purposes. Of this spent money, he collected 
BDT110,000 through taking on loan with high interest rates. He was loaned BDT80,000 with an annual 
interest rate of at 100 per cent. An additional BDT30,000 was loaned to him from another informal lender, 
and which cost him yearly 1.1 ton of rice as interest. It is of note that to buy the job contract/visa, he had to 
spend BDT160,000, and all of the loaned money was needed to meet this expense.
Source: In-person interview conducted by the study team.
3.2.1 Migration cost and related 
financing
As describe in Section 3.1, 78 per cent of 
recruitment and migration cost, on average, is 
actually incurred by intermediaries and other 
helpers (IOM, 2010). These cost turn out to be 
burdensome on migrants, especially considering 
their mode of financing. About 67 per cent 
of migrant workers secure funds to pay for 
recruitment and migration by taking out loans. 
A considerable portion of migrant workers also 
finance the cost of migration by selling land (24 
per cent), mortgaging land (23 per cent), and/or 
selling assets such as jewellery, cattle, trees, or 
homes (20 per cent) (IOM, 2010). A case study 
hinting at the debt trap potential migrants could 
face by financing migration through such means 
is depicted in Box 3.2.
One of the reasons behind increasing recruitment 
and migration cost and the exploitation of migrant 
workers is the unhealthy competition that exists 
among recruiting agents and individuals who 
take part in visa trading in GCC countries. Visa 
trading creates an extra layer of illegal cost that 
has to be paid by an illegal sub-agent offering the 
highest price to the employer who is selling the 
visa. Another layer of illegal cost is added when 
that illegal sub-agent, trying to turn a profit on his 
purchase, sells the visa for an even higher price to 
a recruitment agent or a migrant worker. 
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When an overseas recruitment agent or illegal 
sub-agent sells a visa to a recruiting agent 
in Bangladesh, the recruiting agent adds its 
service fees and air fare costs to the price it 
paid for the visa.6 In this environment, migrant 
workers’ attention shifts from the terms and 
conditions of employment and recruitment and 
migration costs get exacerbated. The situation 
gets worse when the recruiting agent sells the 
visas further to the next tier of illegal sub-agent 
or intermediaries in Bangladesh. Eventually, all 
layers of cost are to be borne by the worker, 
who is desperate to find employment overseas.7 
Bangladeshi recruiting agents generally do not 
have direct access to employers in the GCC 
countries. Therefore, the agencies have to rely on 
overseas sub-agents in the destination countries 
in order to procure job contracts. The utilization 
of these illegal sub-agents by Bangladeshi 
recruiting agents increases the cost of migration, 
as the cost borne by the recruiting agents in 
acquiring the services of the overseas illegal 
sub-agents is passed on to potential migrants.8 
According to a sample survey (ILO, 2011), three-
fourths of Bangladeshi migrant workers living in 
Kuwait who utilized private recruiting agents as 
mediators of their migration were not aware of the 
legislations governing the fees that agencies can 
charge. Moreover, half of the surveyed migrants 
were not provided with a proper contract.
According to an owner of a recruiting agency, the 
demand for low-skilled workers in Middle East 
countries has reduced, while the supply of labour 
has increased in Bangladesh. Moreover, recruitment 
through recruiting agents has almost ceased. As a 
result, the procurement of work permits and visas 
through personal contacts and social networks 
6 IOM and RMMRU: Recruitment and placement of Bangladeshi 
migrant workers: An evaluation of the process, 2002, p. 19.
7 Finding of key informant interview with Mr Shameem Ahmed 
Chowdhury Noman, Executive Committee member of BAIRA and 
proprietor of a recruiting agency Sadia International.
8 Finding of key informant interview with Mr Shameem Ahmed 
Chowdhury Noman, Executive Committee member of BAIRA and 
proprietor of a recruiting agency Sadia International.
has increased in recent years. Since the personal 
contacts and people in social networks also indulge 
in visa trading, the scenario leads to high prices for 
job contracts and visas as well as undocumented 
transactions of money between the prospective 
migrant worker and their personal contacts and 
social networks.9
3.2.2 Deception regarding job-related 
entitlements
After getting to countries of destination, 21 per cent 
of Bangladeshi migrant workers who already had 
job contracts found that they were being made to 
do work that was different from what was stipulated 
in their contract. About 46 per cent of migrants 
did not get the remuneration they were promised 
in their employment contract. One of the major 
reasons for this is that many migrants are not well 
educated and lack adequate knowledge to interpret 
the clauses, conditions, and possible loopholes in 
their contract (IOM, 2010). But because they are 
already in the destination countries when they find 
themselves cheated, migrants have no choice but 
to accept whatever is offered to them. This lack 
of choice is no small part due to many migrants 
having arrived in destination countries deeply 
in debt. Having spent a large sum of money on 
recruitment and migration costs, a large portion of 
which often comes from loans or asset mortgages, 
migrants find themselves desperate for a source 
of income, even if it is not what they have been 
promised before departure. 
In some cases, migrants had to pay money before 
even seeing any contract papers. In such cases, 
migrants often find themselves helpless to retrieve 
the money they paid even though it has become 
clear that they were deceived. Very few are lucky 
enough to retrieve from the intermediaries a 
portion of the money they paid (e.g., case of Abul 
Miah delineated in Box 3.3 below). 
9 Finding of key informant interview with Mr Shameem Ahmed 
Chowdhury Noman, Executive Committee member of BAIRA and 
proprietor of a recruiting agency Sadia International.
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Box 3.3: Deception regarding salary: A case 
study
A relative of Abul Miah (pseudonym) promised to send him to Saudi Arabia upon payment of BDT127,000. 
Abul Miah was informed that he would be paid SAR600 per month. After making the payment, Abul Miah 
got his job contract and read through the contract paper to find that the actual salary was SAR350.He 
pressured his relative, who was an intermediary, and managed to get back BDT20,000. This was one of the 
rare cases where the worker was able to read and understand the terms of employment and to reclaim some 
money. 
Source: In-depth interview by the study team.
Most Bangladeshi migrant workers (90 per 
cent) do not see a written contract prior to 
departure, irrespective of their type of visa 
(Afsar, 2009). A contract paper includes all 
information regarding the nature of the work, 
the salary, the duration, and the living and food 
arrangements. Employees should have the right 
to see their contact paper. In fact, there is a legal 
requirement for recruiting agents to show the 
contract papers to their clients. But because of the 
faulty implementation of regulatory mechanisms, 
recruiting agents can easily circumvent this 
regulation. In some cases, recruiting agents do 
not even have adequate information about the 
employer (Afsar, 2009). In this manner, migrants 
are deprived of rightful information that could 
empower them to attain their entitlements. 
According to ILO Migration for Employment 
Convention (Revised) , 1949 (No. 97), Annex 1, 
Article 5:
[The authorities shall] maintain a system 
of supervision of contracts of employment 
between an employer, or a person acting on 
his behalf, and a migrant for employment 
undertakes to require: (a) that a copy of the 
contract of employment shall be delivered 
to the migrant before departure or, if the 
governments concerned so agree, in a 
reception centre on arrival in the territory 
of immigration; (b) that the contract shall 
contain provisions indicating the conditions 
of work and particularly the remuneration 
offered to the migrant; (c) that the migrant 
shall receive in writing before departure, 
by a document which relates either to him 
individually or to a group of migrants of which 
he is a member, information concerning the 
general conditions of life and work applicable 
to him in the territory of immigration. 
The Article further assumes that “the competent 
authority shall ensure that the provisions of the 
preceding paragraphs are enforced and that 
appropriate penalties are applied in respect of 
violations thereof.”
3.2.3 Provision of incorrect information 
on the labour markets and working 
conditions in countries of destination
A lack of labour market analysis and inadequate 
dissemination of information are causes of high 
recruitment and migration cost. For example, 
there is common bit of exaggeration claiming that 
the demand for construction labour in the United 
Arab Emirates is so high that anybody can avail 
themselves of a good job in the construction 
sector. Therefore, potential migrants get the wrong 
impression that if they reach the United Arab 
Emirates by any means, they would be able to 
secure a job.10 A fraction of workers wishing to 
migrate get some information on overseas labour 
10 Key informant interview with illegal sub-agents.
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markets from friends and relatives working in 
destination countries, but almost 45 per cent of 
migrants depend on illegal intermediaries or sub-
agents for such information (IOM, 2010).
In a way, illegal intermediaries and sub-agents 
have a monopoly over labour market information, 
whether accurate or fabricated; even though these 
actors are also not placed to have such information. 
They receive their information from the overseas 
recruiting agents or illegal intermediaries operating 
in destination countries, or from Bangladeshi 
recruiting agents. Many of them do not have the 
means to verify information that they receive, even 
if they wish to. Consequently, illegal intermediaries 
or sub-agents have become an active part of a 
fraudulent employment service system. 
3.2.4 Deception through fake/
inadequate documentation
There are some common strategies through which 
recruiting agents or illegal sub-agents deceive 
prospective migrant workers:
n	non-issuance of employment documents 
such as a written job offer and the 
employment contract;
n	non-issuance of legally valid receipts for 
payments received from the workers;
n	where written contract is issued, 
acceptance of the signature of the 
recruiting agent on the job contract, not 
the worker;
n	issuance of fake job contracts for jobs 
that do not exist;
n	issuance of fake job contracts to be 
used as substitutes for low-paying job 
contracts; and
n	selling fake visas and passports to people 
who are not from the same village or area 
as the sub-agent, in collaboration with 
local officials (Afsar, 2009).
It appears that recruiting agents and sub-agents 
recruit low-skilled workers for jobs requiring 
special skills and thereby charge more money to 
the migrants. In consequence, the employers do 
not get workers with the required skill levels, and 
so they pay less than the contracted wage. In this 
way, recruiting agents and their sub-agents try to 
cheat both workers and employers (Afsar, 2009). 
Box 3.4 illustrates two events of document fraud 
that put workers in vulnerable conditions.
It has been alleged that sometimes the visa for 
single job in Saudi Arabia is “sold” to more than 
one recruiting agent (IOM & RMMRU, 2002). 
It is also suspected that recruiting agents in 
Bangladesh through unethical means offer the 
same job to multiple potential migrants. This 
arrangement leads to the deportation of those 
workers who arrive in the destination country after 
someone else has already taken up the job.11
In-depth interviews with returning migrants reveal 
that, sometimes, recruiting agents were pledge-
bound to send migrants abroad through legal work 
visas, but on the day of migration, the migrants 
found that they were being sent abroad through 
tourist visas. In most cases, the workers were 
deported back to Bangladesh due to their lack of 
legal documents. 
Some recruiting agents, illegal sub-agents, and 
travel agents (also called “tour operators” in 
Bangladesh) are involved in sending migrant 
workers abroad by making fake passports, job 
contracts, BMET clearance certificates, etc. The 
Immigration Department of Bangladesh Police, 
in a discussion, revealed some cases where 
recruiting agents, illegal sub-agents, and travel 
agents were found to be involved in such unethical 
and illegal activities.
11 Key Informant Interview with an Immigration Officer who 
served at Shah Jalal International Airport, Dhaka.
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Box 3.4: Fraudulent practices leading to 
exploitative working and living conditions
During his stay in the United Arab Emirates from 2007 to 2008, Md. Akhlak Uddin (pseudonym) was not 
paid any wages. Before migration, he was told by the illegal sub-agent that he was going to work on an 
agricultural farm and would receive a regular salary. But, in reality, he found himself working as a camel-
herder. The owner of the camels did not pay a monthly salary; he made Md. Akhlak Uddin work for three 
meals a day. Md. Akhlak Uddin was miserable because he had no income to remit to his family. Md. Akhlak 
Uddin managed to negotiate and return home, and the owner paid for the air-ticket cost of BDT30,000. Md. 
Akhlak Uddin is now advocating for the divulging of accurate information about the job and working and 
living conditions to the workers keen to migrate. 
Rahim Gazi (pseudonym) stayed in Kuwait from 2003 to 2004. Before migration, he was told that he will 
be given a desk job in an office or shop. But after reaching Kuwait, Rahim Gazi found himself working as a 
cleaner with a monthly salary equivalent to BDT15,000. The amount was BDT10,000 less than the wage 
that was promised to him by the Bangladeshi recruiting agent. Rahim Gazi migrated on fake papers. He was 
caught by Kuwaiti police in 2004 and kept imprisoned for a month before being deported.
Source: FGD conducted by the study team with returning migrants in Tangail District.
3.2.5 Other problem areas
There are some other points of inconvenience 
or added expense in the migration process as 
reported by migrant workers. Such points of 
include:
n	 Passport office: Sometimes it takes more 
than one month to obtain a passport from 
local passport offices. In addition to that 
waiting period, migrants complain of the 
long times spent in long queues at the 
offices and a lack of available information 
about passport preparation formalities.
n	 Pre-migration medical check-up: Most 
of the designated medical centres are 
located in Dhaka. Recruiting agents or 
illegal sub-agents usually arrange an 
appointment date for a medical check-up, 
as the workers themselves cannot afford 
to be in Dhaka to book an appointment 
and wait until the appointed date. 
Prospective migrant workers often end up 
incurring additional cost, however, when 
the recruitment agent or the illegal sub-
agent mismanages the booking.
n	 Entitlement of pre-departure briefing by 
BMET: A majority of respondents did not 
have any form of pre-departure training or 
briefing prior to migration. Some recruiting 
agents avoid sending their workers to such 
briefings and trainings organized by the 
BMET, and instead pay bribes to obtain 
the certificates for prospective migrant 
workers.
n	 Airport of the country of destination: 
Sometimes, overseas employers or their 
recruitment agents are supposed to 
pick the employee up from the airport. 
However, there is evidence that employers 
often do not escort their employee or 
delay escorting them. Hence, the newly 
migrated employees are left stranded 
outside the airport for a period of time. 
This not only causes anxiety among the 
migrant workers, it also puts migrant 
women workers in a vulnerable situation 
(Afsar, 2009).
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Administrative formalities often turn out to be 
cumbersome for potential migrant workers. 
Hence, they become more inclined to rely on 
intermediaries or recruiting agents to handle 
these administrative formalities on their behalf. 
This reliance makes them more susceptible to 
exploitation by intermediaries.12
3.2.6 Exploitation in the country of 
destination
A report by the ILO (2011) indicates that six per 
cent of Bangladeshi migrant workers in Kuwait and 
15 per cent of those in the United Arab Emirates 
reported that their employers required them to work 
jobs beyond the one specified in their work visas. 
The report points out that, although the majority of 
construction workers in these countries are aware 
of the notice period required for their dismissal, 
most domestic workers are not aware of the job 
dismissal procedure. In fact, a lack of contract 
papers made migrant worker more vulnerable to 
exploitation by employers. The report identified 
that confiscation of migrant workers’ passports by 
employers is another major instrument of labour 
exploitation in GCC countries that often leads to 
conditions of forced labour. 
The ILO report further brings out that none of 
the migrant workers in the United Arab Emirates 
is in possession of their passport. Recruiting 
agents and illegal sub-agents tend to put this as 
a condition before the workers migrate. In Kuwait, 
about 81 per cent of workers do not possess their 
passports. Awareness of their rights as workers 
and human rights is extremely low among the 
migrant workers. About 35 per cent of workers felt 
it was improper for their employer to confiscate 
their workers’ passports. Confiscation of the 
12 According to ILO’s Migration for Employment (Revised) 
Convention, 1949 (No. 97) a member will ensure: (a) the 
simplification of administrative formalities; (b) the provision of 
interpretation services; (c) any necessary assistance during an 
initial period in the settlement of the migrants and members of 
their families authorized to accompany or join them; and (d) the 
safeguarding of the welfare, during the journey and in particular 
on board ship, of migrants and members of their families 
authorised to accompany or join them. (Annex-1, Article 6).
passport is a violation of the principles of the ILO’s 
Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) and the 
Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 
105) (ILO, 2011). The United Arab Emirates and 
Kuwait have ratified both Conventions.
3.3 Linkages between high recruitment 
and migration cost with trafficking/forced 
labour/debt bondage
In many instances, it has been found that a high 
cost of recruitment and migration is connected 
with trafficking or forced labour, debt bondage, 
and loss of remittance. These linkages, as 
discussed in the focus group discussions, may 
develop in the following ways:
n	 If the cost of labour migration through 
official channels is high, then involvement 
in the legal migration process will be low. 
This causes a concomitant rise in the use 
of irregular migration channels. People who 
migrate via an undocumented channel are 
more likely to find themselves in a trafficking 
or forced labour situation.
n	 If someone who is low-skilled wants 
to migrate to take up a skilled or semi-
skilled job overseas, they have to invest 
more in the migration process. In other 
words, they have to pay a much higher 
amount to the recruiting agents to secure 
work that they lack the skills to adequately 
perform. The workers’ intention is to get 
a job that pays better than typical low-
skilled positions, but after taking up the 
employment in a country of destination, 
they face humiliation, exploitation, 
and physical and mental torture at the 
hands of their employer or supervisors. 
Many times, when it is recognized that 
the migrant workers do not meet the 
required skills criteria and have used 
forged papers, these workers are put 
under conditions similar to bondage 
labour. Workers in such situations are not 
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able to seek help and try to bear with the 
exploitative situation as long as they can. 
n	 There are instances when a recruitment 
agent or illegal sub-agent agrees to 
accept payment of the recruitment and 
migration cost in instalments. The final 
instalment is usually expected to be paid 
when the worker has taken up the job in 
the country of destination. If a migrant 
fails to pay the total recruitment and 
migration cost, the recruiting agent or 
the illegal sub-agents in the destination 
country, who collaborate with their 
counterparts in Bangladesh, take away 
the worker’s passport and compel the 
migrant worker to continue the work 
under a “debt bondage” situation until 
the balance due has been recovered. 
In such a situation, a recruiting agent or 
illegal sub-agent usually colludes with the 
employer, and the migrant worker has to 
put in extra working hours until the time 
the recruiting agent or illegal sub-agent 
and the employer are satisfied
n	 Sometimes, prospective migrant workers 
are promised well-paid, skilled jobs. The 
workers, depending on the their families’ 
economic situation, take out loans to pay 
the high recruitment and migration costs 
demanded to secure these positions. The 
local money lender expects repayment 
at a high interest rate within a given 
timeframe. But when workers then find 
themselves caught in a low-paying job 
upon arrival in a country of destination, 
they look for opportunities to return home. 
In such cases, either the worker upon 
return or the worker’s family is forced to 
work for free to repay the loan or must 
find some other way to free themselves of 
indebtedness. 
The issue of high recruitment and migration 
costs was addressed at length in the 2011 Multi-
stakeholder Roundtable on Bangladeshi Migrants 
held by the Institute for Human Rights and 
Business (IHRB) in Dhaka. As the report from that 
meeting states, “Fees create debt bondage. Before 
workers even arrive in the factory they are bonded 
by fees they have paid and the commitments they 
have made to brokers. As the worker progresses 
through the recruitment cycle they often face 
mounting debt. So when they finally arrive at the 
factory for work, they will do anything not be sent 
home” (IHRB & RMMRU, 2011, p. 3).
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Policies and legal 
regime on recruitment 
and migration
C h a p t e r   4
4.1 Existing policies and legal regime
Until 1982, the Emigration Act, 1922, was the 
main act addressing the issues of migration 
in Bangladesh. However, considering major 
changes in the global labour migration process, 
the Government of Bangladesh took an active 
role in stimulating labour migration from 1976 
onwards. Labour migration was seen as a means 
to alleviate unemployment and generate foreign 
income (Jureidini, 2001, cited in De Bruyn & 
Kuddus, 2005). In this connection, the most 
important piece of legislation designed to control 
labour migration is the Emigration Ordinance, 
1982, which replaced the Immigration Act, 1922. 
The Registrar of Emigrants appointed under the 
Ordinance was made responsible for overseas 
labour migration and authorized to promote and 
regulate emigration. The importance of labour 
migration was also highlighted in the subsequent 
five-year national development plans of 
Bangladesh (Morshed, no date, cited in De Bruyn 
& Kuddus, 2005).
Policies and the legal regime on specific issues 
evolve over time in consideration of the dynamics 
of social structure and economics. Considering the 
importance of labour migration from Bangladesh, 
several policies, acts, and rules have been 
adopted by the Government of Bangladesh over 
the last decade. The relevant policies/acts/rules on 
recruitment and migration are noted below:
The cost
Causes of and redress related to the high recruitment and migration costs in Bangladesh
42
n Law: 
•	 The Overseas Employment and 
Migrants Act, 2013, which replaced 
the Emigration Ordinance, 1982.
n Rules:
• Emigration Rules, 2002.
• Recruiting Agents Conduct and 
Licence Rules, 2002.
• Wage Earners’ Welfare Fund Rules, 
2002.
n Policies:
• Overseas Employment Policy, 2006.
In context of Bangladesh, the ILO Migration for 
Employment Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97), 
the Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) 
Convention, 1975 (No. 143), the ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998), 
and the ILO non-binding Multilateral Framework on 
Labour Migration (2005) are important sources of 
protection for Bangladeshi migrant workers.1 These 
rights catalogued in these instruments relate to 
remuneration, membership in trade unions, collective 
bargaining, social security, legal proceedings, and 
equal opportunity and treatment for migrant and 
national workers.
Bangladesh signed the 1990 UN Convention on 
the Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers 
and Their Families on 7 October 1998, and ratified 
the Convention on 24 August 2011. Bangladesh 
has also initiated some significant policies, acts, 
and plans in recent years (shown in Table 4.1). 
However, Bangladesh has not ratified a number 
of ILO Conventions that deal with ethical labour 
recruitment issues.2
Table 4.1: Some recent initiatives of the Government of Bangladesh on recruitment and migration issues 
Principles/policy/act/bill Key features/status
Dhaka Principles
The Dhaka Principles provide a roadmap that traces the worker from recruitment to 
the end of their contract. Based on UN guiding principles, these were first shared 
publicly at a migration roundtable in Dhaka in June 2011.
National Skill Development 
Policy (NSDP)
The NSDP is an initiative aimed at bringing Bangladeshi migrant workers up 
to internationally recognized skills standards. The NSDP was approved by the 
Government of Bangladesh in January 2012. To strengthen this policy, a technical 
and vocation education and training (TVET) framework is also being developed by 
the TVET Reform Project of the Government of Bangladesh and the ILO (ILO-TVET 
Reform Project & NSDC Secretariat, 2012).
Human Trafficking 
Deterrence and Suppression 
Act, 2012
This Act is aimed at protecting potential migrant workers from trafficking and 
fraudulent recruitment by local recruiting agents as well as brokers in destination 
countries.
Proposed Overseas 
Employment Policy
Based on an initiative by the ILO Bangladesh Office. Principles of the ILO Multilateral 
Framework on Labour Migration are applied in the proposed policy, and includes 
principles of decent work, bilateral and international cooperation, knowledge-base, 
operational efficiency, social protection of the workers, recruitment regulations, 
return and reintegration and migration and development. There is also a dedicated 
chapter on women migrant workers.
1 Findings of key informant interview.
2 For instance, the Private Employment Agencies Convention, 1997 (No. 181).
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4.2 Mechanisms for regulating recruiting 
agents
Private recruiting agents in Bangladesh are 
regulated by the BMET under the Recruiting 
Agents Conduct and Licence Rules, 2002, which 
is due to be revised in 2014. 
4.2.1 Overseas Employment and 
Migrants’ Act, 2013
The Overseas Employment and Migrants’ Act, 2013 
(hereafter called the “Migrants’ Act 2013”) is the first 
law on migration and overseas employment passed 
by the Parliament of Bangladesh. This law replaces 
the Emigration Ordinance, issued by the president 
in 1982. It has a dedicated chapter on regulation 
of recruitment. Section 9 of the law lays down 
the list of professional background- and conduct-
related documents that must be submitted by an 
applicant wishing to apply for a licence to recruit 
for the international labour market. This section 
makes it mandatory that only a license-holder can 
be a recruitment agent and thereby it places the 
government as the primary recruiter, establishes 
private sector recruiters as recruitment agents of 
the government, and renders all intermediaries and 
sub-agents of the agents illegal. Section 9 requires 
the government to investigate an applicant’s past 
conduct before issuing a license. It also requires 
the government to take security money in the form 
of a license fee from the applicant, who is to be 
issued a recruitment agent licence. 
The Section 10 of the Migrants’ Act 2013 puts forth 
eligibility criteria that must be met by an applicant. 
This section also sets the way for the international 
recruitment organizations to obtain a recruitment 
agent licence and to operate from Bangladesh, if 
60 per cent of shares in or capital ownership of 
that organization is with Bangladeshi nationals.
Whether issued to an individual or to an organization, 
the recruitment license, as per Sub-section 17(1), 
17(2), and 17(3) of the Migrants’ Act 2013, is 
non-transferable. If a recruitment agent dies, their 
heir may apply for the license and may be issued a 
new license with the same license number as that 
of the deceased’s. But if the heir does not meet all 
the criteria, the license will not be issued. Similarly, 
a license-holding company is required to seek the 
approval of the government before making any 
change in the ownership pattern. As per the Sub-
section 18(5), a recruitment agent may surrender 
the license and reclaim the security money before 
the expiry of the license, or in cases of the death 
of the license-holding person or dissolution of 
the license-holding company, as per Sub-section 
18(5), the security money will be refunded. 
In order to ensure monitoring of recruitment agents, 
Section 11 of the law clarifies that the recruitment 
license is renewable but valid for a period of 
three years at a time. Further, Section 13 of the 
Migrants’ Act lays down the conditions or reasons 
that may lead to cancellation or suspension of the 
license. The listed reasons cover a variety of ways 
in which migrant workers have been cheated, 
exploited, or abused by recruitment agents and 
illegal intermediaries or sub-agents who operate 
on behalf of the recruitment agents. Sub-sections 
18(1) to 18(4) further specify the grounds on 
which the government may cancel or suspend a 
license and forfeit the security money. 
To help the recruitment agents understand 
performance requirements, Section 16 places 
a responsibility on the government to establish 
a performance-based grading system for the 
classification of recruitment agents. Moreover, 
Sub-sections 17 (4) and 17 (5) require that the 
whereabouts of all of the recruitment agent’s work 
premises should be recorded with the government 
and be public knowledge. 
To address the challenge that recruitment agents 
may have with regard to extent of their ability to 
reach persons interested in working overseas, 
Section 14 of the Migrants Act 2013 permits 
recruitment agents to open branch offices. Section 
15 lays down the duties of recruitment agents 
to ensure safe migration and protection of the 
workers’ interests. 
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4.2.2 Recruiting Agents Conduct and Licence Rules, 2002
According to BMET officials, the BMET strictly tries to follow the Recruiting Agents Conduct and Licence 
Rules, 2002, in regulating private recruiting agents. The regulating mechanism (licensing and licence 
renewal) is delineated in Figure 4.1:
Figure 4.1: Licence approval and renewal procedure for 
recruiting agents
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According to the Recruiting Agents Conduct and License Rules 2002, recruiting agents must conform to 
the following prescribed modes of conduct (not exclusive):
n	 maintain regular office and signboard;
n	 maintain an information and consultation centre;
n	 recruit competent candidates for migration and recruit candidates from the databank of potential 
candidates. If competent candidates cannot be found from the databank, the candidate needs to 
be selected from among applicants who have registered with DEMOs;
n	 recruiting agents will avoid competition for visas, work permits, etc., among themselves;
n	 recruiting agents will not accept from employers any terms or conditions that violate the minimum 
bar for salary/wage and service terms as approved by the government;
n	 agents will ensure that employers maintain the service terms during the service time;
n	 agents will give a contract paper to each emigrant and explain the contents of that contract to the 
emigrant in front of the registrar;
n	 recruiting agents will not demand any additional fees (except service charges) from migrants;
n	 agents will not deliberately recruit unqualified employees for the employer;
n	 agents will give proper information to potential migrants in their advertisements;
n	 agents will meet the demand for labour from the international labour market efficiently;
n	 agents will ensure the presence of selected workers at the BMET briefing centre for pre-departure 
briefings;
n	 a recruiting agent needs to have found employment abroad for a minimum of 300 migrant workers 
within the last five years (otherwise their license will expire and half of the security deposit will be 
forfeited); and
n	 recruiting agents will provide a receipt for all payments received from migrants/potential migrants. 
In addition, from time to time, the government will determine and publish (through the Gazette) the 
amounts that recruiting agents can charge as service charge. Through notices, the government will also 
fix fees related to medical tests, passports, visas, and embarkation. According to the Rules, recruiting 
agents are supposed to obey the instruction published in those Gazettes and notifications. 
4.2.3 Overseas Employment Policy, 2006
The Overseas Employment Policy, 2006, was adopted with a view toward fulfilling the vision of the 
government regarding overseas employment. The Policy delineates some specific activities related to 
regulating the recruitment process. Table 4.2 gives a breakdown of some of the activities prescribed in the 
Policy and address the successes that have resulted through the implementation of the Policy as well as gaps 
that remain to be filled.
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Table 4.2: Selective policy outcomes (gaps/failures and successes) related 
to the Overseas Employment Policy, 2006
Se
ct
io
n 
of
 th
e 
Po
lic
y
Activities Gaps/Successes
5.
4.
3
Fix reasonable migration costs for various 
job categories by comparing expenses in 
destination country, airfare, passport cost, 
medical fees, service charges for recruiting 
agents, training expenses, etc. with those 
of other labour-sending countries filling 
similar job categories, and disseminate such 
migration costs widely in print and electronic 
media.
•	 Though the government fixed a maximum recruitment 
and migration cost of BDT84,000, in practice it has not 
been applied.
•	 Information on the maximum recruitment and migration 
cost of BDT84,000 has not been disseminated among 
the citizenry.
•	 Though the government prescribed some specific 
costs for airfare, medical fees, service charges, etc., 
Government could formulate a flexible cost structure that 
considers demand variations in the overseas job market 
(i.e., a market-based approach).
5.
4.
5
Ensure that all types of financial transactions 
engaged in by recruiting agents in their 
recruitment process are done through the 
banking system, and take legal action against 
recruiting agents who do not comply.
•	 Enforcement of formal financial transactions has been 
very weak.
•	 Quick action on victims’ complaints to the BMET 
against recruiting agent who do not issue receipts, etc. 
is possible, but poor awareness of this provision among 
victims hinders them from making a strong, evidence-
based allegation. In many cases, victims cannot 
differentiate between illegal intermediaries and recruiting 
agencies. Moreover, victims get involved in informal 
financial transactions without proper documentation and 
do not have any evidence whatsoever of having made 
payments. Hence, the results sought by the Policy have 
not materialized.
5.
4.
6 Control recruitment through computerized 
registration and creation of a database or 
workers willing to migrate.
•	 The government can claim success in this respect. The 
Smart Card, Online Visa checking, and online registration 
of workers, even though in their initial stages and not 
without some technical hitches, are notable achievements 
of the Government of Bangladesh.
5.
4.
8
All steps are to be taken to ease and modernize 
the issuance of state-of-the-art passports 
to migrant workers, and also to ensure the 
issuance of police clearances within 15 
days of a worker submitting an application. 
(Recruiting agents and intermediaries are 
deeply involved in the process of issuing 
passports and police clearances).
•	 Government has achieved remarkable success in 
modernizing the issuance of digital passport facilities. 
•	 Government also has modernized the issuance of police 
clearance certificates. The one stop service of Bangladesh 
Police is quite successful in terms of establishing an easy 
procedure and a less time-consuming process (seven 
days). However, it is alleged that at the inspection level, 
corruption exists.
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Table 4.2: Selective policy outcomes (gaps/failures and successes) related 
to the Overseas Employment Policy, 2006
Se
ct
io
n 
of
 th
e 
Po
lic
y
Activities Gaps/Successes
5.
4.
9 To take legal actions against illegal and 
unauthorized employment by recruiting 
agents and enact new laws, if needs be.
•	 Considering the importance of labour migration, the 
Government of Bangladesh has already initiated steps 
to enact new laws like the Overseas Employment and 
Migrants’ Act 2013.
4.
10
Make provisions for rewarding and honouring 
recruiting agents on the basis of their 
contribution in opening up new markets, 
their success in sending significant numbers 
of skilled workers abroad, and for ensuring 
recruitment with low recruitment and 
migration cost implications but with better 
salaries for the workers.
•	 According to officials of BAIRA and representatives of 
recruiting agencies, the government has not instituted 
any functional reward or incentive-based mechanism.
4.2.4 Gaps in mechanism for regulating 
private recruiting agents and in the 
overall labour migration system
A number of mechanisms for regulating private 
recruiting agents have been tried in Bangladesh. 
However, none have been particularly effective. In 
the past few years, Bangladesh has lost certain 
significant overseas job markets. Unethical 
recruitment practices are considered one of 
the most crucial reasons behind these bans on 
recruitment from Bangladesh. The noticeable 
signs of unethical recruitment and labour migration 
practice are delineated in Table 4.3. This section 
deals with some specific gaps in the mechanism 
for regulating private sector recruiting agents and 
in the labour migration system of Bangladesh in 
general.
Three major problems with the Emigration 
Ordinance, 1982 that governed migration from 
Bangladesh till the new 2013 law came into effect 
were: First, it penalized the workers if they were 
to leave their job and return while the contract 
was still in effect. Second, it did not give migrant 
workers the right to seek direct legal redress. 
Finally, it did not grant the right to association 
to the workers while granting this same right to 
the recruitment agents. Under this Ordinance, 
only the government could lodge complaints 
on behalf of the workers. But recruiting agents 
and their association are influential, and they 
have been able to thwart efforts to regulate 
them. Due to these factors and in the absence 
collective bargaining ability, the prevailing 
situation served as a contrivance for catching 
and holding Bangladeshi migrant workers. So far, 
the government has never filed a case against a 
recruiting agent for a violation of the Emigration 
Ordinance, 1982 (Ahmed, 2013).
Other failures in the legal regime, so far, relate 
specifically to the regulating of private recruiting 
agents. Some of these regulatory gaps are given 
below:
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n	 Recruiting agencies are expected to 
maintain an information and consultation 
centre. Instead of doing that, in practice, 
illegal intermediaries and sub-agents 
operate from the offices of many 
recruitment agents and also happen to 
be the first point of information access 
for potential migrant workers.3 
n	 There is no compulsion for the 
recruitment agent to initiate and 
complete recruitment in their authorized 
office.
n	 Recruitment agents are not required to 
keep full, accurate and reliable records 
of recruitment processes that would be 
useful in regulation. Such information 
may be used for: complaints by workers 
against the recruitment process, 
overseeing whether or not outgoing 
workers are receiving assistance to 
understand their rights and entitlements, 
and regulatory audits and public 
disclosures.
n	 There are no mechanisms to compare 
job and candidate matches. There is also 
a lack of a mechanism for vetting the 
candidates whose records are included in 
the database, leaving the database open 
to rejection by recruitment agents on the 
grounds of it being poorly managed. 
n	 According to BAIRA, there are no 
specific rules or a policy to regulate 
those Bangladeshis who act as illegal 
intermediaries abroad. Intermediaries 
need to be brought under the law so that 
only those who operate under a licence 
from or registration by the government of 
the destination country can engage with 
recruitment agents in Bangladesh, and 
even then only after the intermediary’s 
licence or registration documents 
3 Finding of key informant interview with a functionary of WARBE.
have been verified by the Bangladeshi 
labour attaché/mission in the country 
concerned.4
n	 Under the existing regulatory 
mechanism, recruiting agents do not 
have responsibility for the conduct of the 
illegal sub-agents and intermediaries who 
operate under their names.
n	 At present, labour attachés of Bangladesh 
verify the demand letters for workers 
presented to them in terms of whether 
or not the employer exists. However, they 
should also look into the qualifications 
and backgrounds of the employers (ILO, 
2012). It is very hard for officials from 
Bangladeshi recruiting agents to obtain 
visas to visit GCC countries, so they do not 
know much about the employers to whom 
they will be sending workers.5
4.2.5 Gaps in coordination mechanisms
Increasing recruitment and migration cost and 
deteriorating conditions for migrant workers 
indicate that there is inadequate coordination 
among government agencies involved with 
international labour migration.
During the February 2013 workshop on building 
knowledge-base and promoting rights of the 
Bangladeshi migrant workers on the move 
stakeholders expressed that there is minimal 
coordination among different government 
divisions. It is glaringly noticed with regard to 
various branches of MEWOE and also in between 
the BMET and the DEMOs. The decentralization 
of power and responsibilities and their proper 
distribution are marked by capacity and 
coordination gaps. The functions of the DEMOs 
need to be distinct and measurable and reporting 
lines clear with the BMET. Not all DEMOs are 
4 Key informant interview with Md. Shahjalal Mazumder, 
President, BAIRA.
5 Key informant interview with an owner of recruiting agency.
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working to their full capacity because of a gap in 
their technical and management abilities.
Different committees at the district level – i.e., 
counter trafficking, human rights – do not work in 
coordination with the District Welfare Desk. There 
remains a lack of coordination in ensuring safe 
migration and protection from human trafficking 
among the various responsible government 
ministries. Some effort needs to be made to clarify 
the operating procedures among these ministries 
when they come across irregular migration and 
smuggling or trafficking in persons. 
The Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism is 
responsible for the licensing of travel agencies, 
while the BMET is responsible for the licensing of 
recruiting agents. However, minimal cooperation 
is exhibited between these two ministries in 
sharing relevant information (Rajput, 2011).
The BMET is under MEWOE, and it appears 
there is no direct coordination among the BMET, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry 
of Home Affairs. In line with the policy outline 
developed by the Government of the Philippines, 
a central and national monitoring committee 
headed by the Minister of MEWOE could monitor 
day-to-day affairs via a networked system.
However, the Government of Bangladesh has 
taken several steps to minimize the gaps in 
coordination. MEWOE has formed a “Vigilance 
Taskforce” with representation from other 
relevant ministries/agencies: Home Affairs, 
Foreign Affairs, Civil Aviation, the BMET, etc. The 
role of this taskforce is to curb the fraudulent 
activities of unscrupulous recruiting agents 
and intermediaries who create problems by 
cheating workers or engaging in corruption in the 
migration process. 
4.3 Gaps in policy and legal regime
In this section, existing policies, rules, and 
ordinances relevant to the labour recruitment 
and international migration system of 
Bangladesh are analyzed in comparison with 
the Private Employment Agencies Convention, 
1997 (No. 181) of the ILO. The Government of 
Bangladesh has not yet ratified this Convention. 
Nonetheless, the Convention can be considered 
a benchmark for analyzing the relevant policies 
and legal regime of Bangladesh. 
In Table 4.3, Articles from Convention No. 181 
are compared against the existing recruitment 
and migration system-related policies and legal 
regime of Bangladesh. The table also delineates 
the current problems and unethical practices 
found in the international migration situation that 
can be associated with the inadequacy of the 
present regulatory regime.
In addition to the negative practices listed in 
Table 4.3, there is an important gap that hinders 
migrant workers’ ability to seek redress. Though 
the BMET has maintained an online complaints 
mechanism, the mechanism is not accessible 
or usable tool for a vast majority of migrant 
workers (Rajput, 2011). This may be because 
a large number of Bangladeshi workers lack 
functional literacy and access and ability to use 
a computer and the Internet. A more human 
interaction-based complaints mechanism with 
strong witness protection orientation and support 
services for workers who complain would help 
encourage workers to file complaints as well as 
provide more effective redress.
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Table 4.3: Unethical labour migration practices in Bangladesh and the international and national 
instruments meant to curb these practices
ILO Convention  
No. 181
Article 7
1.Private employment agencies shall not charge directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, 
any fees or costs to workers.
2. In the interest of the workers concerned, and after consulting the most representative 
organizations of employers and workers, the competent authority may authorize exceptions 
to the provisions of paragraph 1 above in respect of certain categories of workers, as well as 
specified types of services provided by private employment agencies.
Bangladeshi 
Policy, Ordinance 
and Rules as of 23 
Oct. 2013
The Emigration Ordinance, 1982
23. Receiving money, etc, for providing foreign employment.
Whoever for providing or securing, or on the pretext of providing or securing, to or for any 
person, employment in any country beyond the limits of Bangladesh -
(a) being a recruiting agent, charges any fee in addition to the prescribed amount;
(b) not being a recruiting agent, demands or receives or attempts to receive, for himself or 
for any other person any money or other valuable thing;
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years, or with 
fine, or with both.
Recruiting Agents Conduct and Licence Rules, 2002:
5. Licence Renewal :
(4) Licence will be void during licence renewing, if the Director General is satisfied with the 
following issues (among others): 
- Applicant recruiting agents is involved in charging additional cost to migrant workers.
7. Conduct of Recruiting agents:
Recruiting agent will:
- Have regular office and associated signboard
- Have information counselling centre for counselling potential migrant 
- Recruit labour from database. In case of non-availability of appropriate job seeker 
in database, job seeker registered in district manpower office will be considered for 
recruitment. 
- except service charge, no other fee can be charged to potential migrant worker
Overseas Employment Policy, 2006:
4. Principal: 
4.01 Ensure opportunities for all aspirant Bangladeshis from anywhere in the country at 
Reasonable cost for both short-term and long-term Migration.
4.08 Manage the recruitment process efficiently.
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Negative practices •	 In reality, sub-agents and dalals exist, and since their existence is not accounted for in the 
legal framework, they operate without any regulation. Due to their intervention, the cost of 
migration increases, and it remains undocumented.
•	 Recruiting agents also like to rely on sub-agents/dalals for directly approaching potential 
migrant workers, as the agencies do not want to expand their office to grassroots locations.
•	 Although recruiting agents acknowledge the importance of recruiting labour from the 
database developed by government institutions, in reality, sub-agents and dalals remain 
the dominant recruiters in the current system.
•	 Staff of recruiting agents often function as dalals in the recruitment process. Even if an 
interested worker comes to a recruiting agent to migration through the official process, 
they still have to proceed through a dalal stationed at the recruiting agent’s office. [Source: 
Interview with representative from WARBE].
•	 Recruiting agents, their sub-agents, and dalals all have possible means to circumvent the 
policies and legal regime that specify appropriate conduct in the recruitment process.
[For example: In 2007, a recruiting agent located in Dhaka advertised in a national daily 
newspaper that it was on recruiting workers for a plantation in New Zealand. The agent 
also asserted that potential migrants would bear only the recruitment cost that had been 
approved by the Government of Bangladesh. But one member of the recruitment agent’s 
staff admitted in an interview with the study team that the advertisement was an official 
formality to appease the government that the agent went through to cover up a more 
deceptive mode of operating. In this instance, according to the staff, the workers for the 
New Zealand job had already been selected prior to the posting of the advertisement, and 
each migrant paid about BDT1 million to BDT1.2 million to secure the job – far more than 
the government-approved maximum.]
•	 Recruitment through individual initiative is a major aspect of the labour migration system 
in Bangladesh. In this regard, the government can exert little influence over the cost 
structure of this type of labour migration process under the existing framework. [Source: 
Interview with a member of BAIRA].
•	 Recruiting agents buy job contracts from sub-agents located in destination countries. The 
existence of such sub-agents increases the cost of job offers by at least 30 per cent. This 
added cost is ultimately borne by labour migrants.
•	 It is very seldom for workers to receive a proper receipt for any moneys paid during the 
recruitment and migration process.
•	 Financing of recruitment and migration cost is another major challenge. Lack of access 
to formal credit system forces potential migrant workers to rely on high interest rate loans 
from the informal financing sector. This increases the real cost of migration.
•	 Costs are higher because the government has not done an adequate job of disseminating 
information about migration and cost. Moreover, at DEMOs, the ignorance of office staff 
and a lack of decentralization of responsibility are also reasons behind the inadequate 
dissemination of information to potential migrants [Finding of Workshop on building 
knowledge-base and promoting rights of the Bangladeshi migrant workers on the move, 
2013].
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ILO Convention  
No. 181
Article 8
1. A Member shall, after consulting the most representative organizations of employers and 
workers, adopt all necessary and appropriate measures, both within its jurisdiction and, where 
appropriate, in collaboration with other Members, to provide adequate protection for and prevent 
abuses of migrant workers recruited or placed in its territory by private employment agencies. 
These shall include laws or regulations which provide for penalties, including prohibition of 
those private employment agencies which engage in fraudulent practices and abuses.
Bangladeshi 
Policy, Ordinance 
and Rules as of 23 
Oct. 2013
The Emigration Ordinance, 1982
14. Cancellation, suspension, forfeiture of security, etc. [see details.]
23. Receiving money, etc., for providing foreign employment.
Whoever for providing or securing, or on the pretext of providing or securing, to or for any 
person, employment in any country beyond the limits of Bangladesh -
(a) being a recruiting agent, charges any fee in addition to the prescribed amount;
(b) not being a recruiting agent, demands or receives or attempts to receive, for himself or for 
any other person any money or other valuable thing;
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years, or with fine, 
or with both.
Recruiting Agents Conduct and Licence Rules, 2002:
5. Licence Renewal:
(4) Licence will be void during licence renewing, if Director General is satisfied with the following 
issues (among others)- 
- Applicant recruiting agent is involved in charging additional cost to migrant workers.
- Recruiting agent has a record of sending labour through an irregular process.
7. Conduct of Recruiting agents:
 Recruiting agent will:
- Avoid competition with other recruiting agents
- Not contract labour beyond the minimum criteria of salary and other benefit as set by the 
government.
- Secure the conformity of job contract after the migration of respective worker 
- Provide copy of the contract to the potential migrant and explain content of the contract 
elaborately
- Not provide different skill level worker to recruiter [than what was demanded].
11. Service Charge:
- On a timely basis, the government will determine service charges through a circular. 
- Other fees like health check-up, passport, and visa fee will not be included in service 
charges. These fees will be also fixed by the government.
- Before selection, recruiting agents will not demand any money from potential migrants. 
Recruiting agents will not take any money from potential migrants without giving an 
appropriate money receipt
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Overseas Employment Policy, 2006:
4. Principal: 
4.09 To brand fraudulence practices in the migration process as offences against the national 
interest and formulate new laws, as needs be, to prosecute any such offender whether he/she 
is an individual, a government employee, or a private enterprise. 
4.10 Make provisions for rewarding and honouring recruiting agents on the basis of their 
contribution in opening new markets, success in sending significant numbers of skilled workers, 
skilled female workers, and for procuring demands at low migration cost with better salaries.
5. Implementation:
5.1.8 Increase the duration and also spread to the divisional and district level, the ongoing 
pre-migration briefings programs given to the migrant workers for preliminary ideas on their 
duties, nature of job, salaries and benefits, the culture and laws in the host countries, and also 
to review and change the curriculum and to print and distribute booklets containing pertinent 
information for migrant workers.
5.1.9 To save aspirant migrant workers from fraudulent practices and to create awareness of 
the risk and bad consequences of irregular migration, a concerted campaign is to be launched 
in print and electronic media to inform the people of the process of regular migration, migration 
cost, job natures, salaries and other benefits, usual terms of contract, the necessity of a written 
agreement with the employer, etc.
5.1.1 Ensure specific mention of working hours, rate of wages, over-time, leave, health services, 
entertainment mobility, etc. in the job contract between the worker and employer.
5.4.2 Set specific standards for issuing and renewing licenses of recruiting agents.
5.4.3 Fix category-wise reasonable migration cost by comparing expenses in the employing 
country, airfare, passport fees, medical fees, service charges for recruiting agents, training 
expenses, etc. with those of other labour sending countries for similar job categories and 
disseminate such migration costs widely in print and electronic media,
5.4.4 Determination of a minimum wage for migrants in accordance with the standards of the 
destination country for different job categories and take all initiatives to ensure receipts of such 
wages.
Negative practices •	 Severe competition among recruiting agents lead them to recruit labour for employers with 
deteriorated terms and conditions.
•	 Many recruiting agents help potential labour migrants to avoid pre-departure training 
organized by the BMET. 
•	 Many migrant workers do not go through their contract papers. Indeed, recruiting agents, 
sub-agents, and dalals circumvent the obligation of showing the job contract to recruited 
workers. And even if the recruited worker tries to go through the contract paper, language 
barriers and highly technical terms within the paper hinder them in comprehending the 
terms and conditions.
•	 Sometimes the recruiting agents cheat both employers and employees. Recruiting agents 
provide low-skilled workers against employer requests for semi-skill workers. Jobs requiring 
skills grant larger salaries, so recruiting agents demand extra money from potential migrants 
to secure those positions. At the same time, the agencies receive more money from the 
overseas recruiter because the agency ostensibly has to put in extra effort to find a skilled 
worker. Ultimately, when the employer finds out that the worker does not have the necessary 
skills, the employer refuses to pay the worker the agreed upon wage. This leaves the worker 
having paid extra money to get the job (and possibly going into debt to do so), but with a 
smaller salary than anticipated. 
•	 The BMET’s processes for supervising recruiting agents are cumbersome and inadequate.
•	 Sometimes the employer’s representatives do not show up to  receive the migrant workers 
at the airport in the destination country.
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ILO Convention  
No. 181
Article 9
2. Where workers are recruited in one country for work in another, the Members concerned 
shall consider concluding bilateral agreements to prevent abuses and fraudulent practices in 
recruitment, placement and employment.
Bangladeshi 
Policy, Ordinance 
and Rules as of 23 
Oct. 2013
Overseas Employment Policy 2006:
5. Implementation: 
5.1.1 Sign bilateral agreements or Memorandums of Understanding with destination countries.
5.1.6 In league with other countries of origin, articulate and press for rights and related issues 
of migrant workers in international forums.
Negative practices •	 The Government of Bangladesh has failed to forge bilateral agreement with destination 
countries to reduce the role of sub-agents in countries of destination.
•	 There is also an allegation that, particularly when it comes to violations of job contracts by 
employers in country of destination, the Government of Bangladesh has little influence over 
the governments of destination countries to address issues related to Bangladeshi migrant 
workers.
ILO Convention  
No. 181
Article 10
The competent authority shall ensure that adequate machinery and procedures, involving 
as appropriate the most representative employers and workers organizations, exist for the 
investigation of complaints, alleged abuses and fraudulent practices concerning the activities 
of private employment agencies.
Bangladeshi 
Policy, Ordinance 
and Rules as of 23 
Oct. 2013
The Emigration Ordinance, 1982
26. Special courts- 
(1) The government may, by notification in the official Gazette, establish as many special courts 
as it considers necessary for trial of offences under this ordinance and, where it establishes 
more than one special court, shall specify in the notification the headquarters of each special 
court and the territorial limits within which it shall exercise jurisdiction under this ordinance.
(2) A special court shall consist of a person who is the Chairman of a Labour Court established 
under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (XXIII of 1969).
(3) A special court shall take cognizance of, and have jurisdiction to try, an offence punishable 
under this ordinance only upon a complaint in writing made by such person as the government 
may, by a general or special order, authorize in this behalf.
(4) A special court trying an offence under this ordinance shall try such offence summarily and 
in trying such offences, such special court shall follow the procedure laid down in the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898) for summary trial.
Recruiting Agents Conduct and Licence Rules, 2002:
3. Application for licence:
E. Applicant must provide organizational chart and list of staff, including their photograph.
5. License Renewal :
 (1) Application needs to be made addressing the Director General. Application will include a 
self-prepared report delineating the recruiting agents’ activities in the last one year.
(2) Registrar will scrutinize the activities of respective recruiting agents; and based on that 
make a decision on renewal of licence.
Overseas Employment Policy, 2006
5. Implementation:
5.4.5 Ensure all types of financial transactions by recruiting agents in their recruitment process 
go through banks and take legal measures against errant recruiting agents.
5.4.9 To take legal actions against irregular and unauthorized employment by recruiting agents 
and enact new laws, if needs be.
5.4.10 To give legal aid/support to deceived migrant workers at home and abroad.
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Negative practices •	 Migrant workers do not have the right to seek direct legal redress. Only the government 
can lodge complaints for violation of provisions of the Emigration Ordinance, 1982. But the 
recruiting agencies are quite influential and have been able to procure privileges from the 
government. As a result the government has never filed a case against a recruiting agency 
for violations of the Emigration Ordinance (Ahmed, 2013).
•	 Migrant workers have very limited bargaining power in the whole migration process with 
either the government or private sector stakeholders. The right to form an association is not 
guaranteed in the law and policy or the Rules. Migrant workers do not have any platform to 
raise their voice and grievances.
Another important issue with regard to the high cost of recruitment and migration that needs to be 
addressed is the weaknesses in the labour attaché mechanism. The current number of labour attachés 
represents a mere handful in comparison to the demand for their services. Their supervisory and 
accountability lines are critiqued as being complex and inefficient. They are also burdened with a variety 
of responsibilities without having adequate technical capacity or human and financial support to fulfil all 
of these responsibilities. There is an immediate need to plug these loopholes and strengthen the labour 
attaché mechanism to be more efficient in playing a labour oversight and welfare role. 
4.4 Challenges and good practices
The existing migration system and practice in Bangladesh pose a somewhat serious threat to the prospect 
of healthy and progressive labour migration practices in Bangladesh. However, in this respect, some 
international guidelines and examples of good migration practice6 are available for Bangladesh to follow. 
Relevant challenges for Bangladeshi labour migration and relevant good practices for international labour 
migration systems are shown in Table 4.4.
6 Examples of good labour migration practices have been compiled from ILO Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration: Non-binding 
Principles and Guidelines for a Rights-Based Approach to Labour Migration (ILO, 2006) and Monitoring foreign recruitment: Best 
practices from the for [sic] South Asian foreign recruitment monitoring (Rajput, 2011).
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Table 4.4: Challenges and good practices available for Bangladesh’s international labour migration 
system
Existing practices •	 Violations of the terms and conditions of job contracts.
•	 Anxiety and harassment of newly migrated worker during their initial adjustment to living in a new 
country.
Challenges •	 Ensure entitlement of the migrant worker in destination countries.
•	 Ensure proper mechanism to integrate newly migrated workers into the work place and society in 
destination countries.
Guidelines
(in line with the ILO 
Multilateral Framework 
on Labour Migration)
• Networking between workers’ organizations in origin and destination countries to ensure that 
migrant workers are informed of their rights and provided with assistance throughout the migration 
process.
• Facilitating migrant workers’ departure, journey, and reception by providing, in a language they 
understand, information, training, and assistance prior to their departure and on arrival concerning 
the migration process, their rights and the general conditions of life and work in the destination 
country.
Good practices for 
imitation
Malaysia: With the support of the ILO, the Malaysian Trade Union Congress took the initiative to 
highlight and publicize the status of migrant workers in Malaysia and to extend union protection to 
migrant workers. 
Philippines: The Trade Union Congress of the Philippines works with NGOs and the government to 
provide better protection for migrant workers, including women domestic workers.
Union Network International (UNI): UNI, an international organization of trade unions in the professional 
and service sectors, issues an identity document to migrant workers to help them retain their union rights 
and obtain support as they travel from one country to another. Those who were union members in their 
own country can be hosted by a UNI member union in the destination country and receive lists of local 
contacts, information on working conditions, banking, taxes, housing, schools, health care, pensions, and 
other benefits. Advice on labour issues and laws and collective agreements is available, as well as legal 
support in case of a dispute with the employer. UNI distributes a booklet, Working abroad: UNI guidelines, 
which is available on its website in several languages
New Zealand: The government attempts to assist with integration for permanent residence by providing 
a settlement information kit paid by migrant worker fees. The kit covers housing, health, education, 
work, business, government, laws, and integration. The Department of Labour publishes information 
on labour rights in several languages
Sri Lanka: The Migrant Resource Centre of Sri Lanka negotiated agreements with partner organizations 
in major countries of destination, such as the General Federation of Jordanian Trade Unions, to support 
Sri Lankan migrant workers (Rajput, 2011)
Recommendation • Create the environment for strengthening trade unions in home countries so that trade unions can 
effectively manage international labour migration issues.
• Negotiate social protection agreements with the countries of destination that includes a fundamental 
freedom to form migrant workers’ associations. 
• The Government of Bangladesh should make an initiative for forge a network between trade unions 
in Bangladesh and trade unions in destination countries.
• Provide an environment and technical support for local trade unions to get hooked into international 
trade union networks.
• For the above mention initiatives, accept assistance from international organizations like the ILO 
and others.
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Existing practices •	 Trafficking in persons and human smuggling.
•	 Fake documentation used during labour migration process.
Challenges •	 Free/relaxed movement of migrant workers between countries to reduce irregular migration.
•	 Ensure smooth and easy border procedures at airports, seaports, and overland crossings, etc. 
Guidelines
(in line with the ILO 
Multilateral Framework 
on Labour Migration)
• Facilitating the movement of migrant workers between the country in which they work and their 
home country to enable them to maintain family and social ties.
Good practices for 
imitation
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): Since 1975, ECOWAS has had three protocols 
covering the free movement of persons within the member States, their establishment and residence 
and employment access. The issuance of ECOWAS identity documents and modernization of border 
procedures through passport scanning machines facilitates easier movement across borders.
Recommendation • Involvement in protocol/agreement with regional organizations (e.g., SAARC) and specific countries 
for easy labour movement.
• Modernization of immigration systems by establishing networked systems among immigration 
service of member States. 
Existing practices •	 Lack of documentation and data on irregular and regular migration, points of exploitation during 
labour migration, the number of regular and irregular migrants, etc. (e.g., The official figures of the 
Bangladesh and Malaysian governments regarding the number of Bangladeshi migrants staying in 
Malaysia are contradictory.)
Challenges •	 Establishment of knowledge base for initiation and implementation of proper policy measures.
Guidelines
(in line with the ILO 
Multilateral Framework 
on Labour Migration)
• Improving government-capacity and structures for collecting and analyzing labour migration data, 
including sex-disaggregated and other data, and applying it to labour migration policy.
Good practices for 
imitation
A number of countries have their own surveys that deal with international labour migration issues with 
more consideration. Australia, Costa Rica, Ireland, and Portugal are noteworthy examples. In fact, at this 
moment, Bangladesh also has some notable surveys, like the Household Remittance Survey and the 
Household Income Expenditure Survey, that address international labour migration issues.
Australia: The Australian Bureau of Statistics conducts a monthly labour force survey, which includes 
questions on migration. Supplemental surveys on immigrants have also been conducted periodically. The 
Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs develops regular reports using client 
service systems, which include statistics on the number of oversees employees entering Australia.
United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC): One of the major 
programs of ECLAC’s Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Center (CELADE) is the research 
project Investigation of International Migration in Latin America, which began in the 1970s to construct 
a database of information on the main characteristics of migrant populations collected by censuses. 
Most recently, ECLAC/CELADE has also formed the System of Information on International Migration in 
the Countries of the Andean Community (SIMICA).
ILO: The International Migration Program maintains the online International Labour Migration Database, 
which hosts statistical time-series data on labour migration from 86 countries obtained through a mail 
questionnaire survey.
Recommendation • To share country-specific international labour migration statistics, bilateral agreements are needed 
between countries of origin and destination. 
• More cooperation can be established among countries of destination and origin and international 
organizations like the ILO or UNCTAD in developing international labour migration related surveys/ 
censuses and in sharing relevant information.
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Existing practices •	 Lack of supervision and control over International Recruiting agents by the government, as 
alleged by civil society.
Challenges •	 Ensure an ethical recruitment process.
Guidelines
(in line with the ILO 
Multilateral Framework 
on Labour Migration)
• An orderly and equitable process of labour migration should be promoted in both origin and 
destination countries to guide men and women migrant workers through all stages of migration, 
in particular, planning and preparing for labour migration, transit, arrival and reception, return 
and reintegration.
• Governments in both origin and destination countries should give due consideration to licensing 
and supervising recruitment and placement services for migrant workers in accordance with the 
Private Employment Agencies Convention, 1997 (No. 181), and its Recommendation.
Good practices for 
imitation
Philippines: The government identifies labour market niches abroad and arranges an orderly supply 
of labour through supervised recruitment by foreign employers, recruiting agencies, and foreign 
governments based on bilateral agreements. The Philippines Overseas Employment Administration 
(POEA) issues licences to private, Philippines-based recruiting agencies, which must enter into 
legally enforceable work contracts with workers seeking employment abroad. The POEA approves 
these contracts, monitors malpractices, and prosecutes violators of recruitment standards. However, 
the Philippines permits recruiting agencies to require pregnancy and HIV/AIDS testing of workers. 
The POEA formulates emigration policies, campaigns against trafficking, provides pre-departure 
information, addresses labour rights violations abroad, and assists its nationals in destination countries. 
The government can suspend or halt deployment of workers to certain countries in cases of repeated 
abuse. Migrant workers using official channels receive pre-departure training on social and working 
conditions abroad, life insurance and pension plans, medical insurance and tuition assistance for the 
migrant and his or her family, and are eligible for loans. Recruiters must post a bond to provide 
remedies for workers in case of violation of their rights. They must also sign a power of attorney holding 
them liable for contract violations of employers. Incentives are provided to reward recruiters for good 
performance.
Recommendation • MEWOW and the BMET have already initiated several steps for ensuring an ethical international 
recruitment and migration process. However, the good practices of the POEA also can be considered 
in ensuring that the BMET’s activities are even more effective.
Existing practices •	 High cost of migration due lack of demand in overseas job markets; hassles in the migration 
process.
Challenges •	 Reducing cost of migration.
•	 Free/relaxed movement of migrant workers between countries to reduce irregular migration.
Guidelines
(in line with the ILO 
Multilateral Framework 
on Labour Migration)
• Simplifying administrative procedures involved in the migration process and reducing processing 
costs to migrant workers and employers.
Good practices for 
imitation
Canada: The Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program came into being in 1966 and was developed to 
respond to labour shortages faced by farmers. It allows the organized movement of migrant workers 
during the planting and harvesting seasons and is based on MoUs between Canada and Mexico, as well 
as between Canada and various Caribbean countries, primarily Jamaica. 
Spain: Under the “circular migration” project run by Unió de Pagesos in Catalonia, seasonal workers 
are recruited from Morocco, Colombia, and countries in Eastern Europe.
Recommendation • Bilateral or multilateral agreements can be made to arrange temporary labour migration to 
signatory countries.
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Existing practices •	 The number of intermediaries involved in the process, which increases the cost of migration.
Challenges •	 Direct communication between employer and potential employee during the recruitment process.
Guidelines
(in line with the ILO 
Multilateral Framework 
on Labour Migration)
• Facilitating migrant workers’ departure, journey, and reception by providing, in a language 
they understand, information, training, and assistance prior to their departure and on arrival 
concerning the migration process, their rights, and the general conditions of life and work in the 
destination country.
Good practices for 
imitation
Egypt: The Integrated Migration Information System is an Italian-funded project implemented in Egypt 
by the IOM. It has an online database at the Ministry of Manpower and Migration for Egyptians wishing 
to migrate to Italy. A job-matching system for Egyptian applicants and Italian employers provides 
Egyptians with access to the Italian labour market information system and enables them to apply for 
jobs in Italy online. 
Recommendation • Bilateral agreements can be made to establish an organized database through which employers 
of one country can directly recruit employees from Bangladesh.
Existing practices •	 Potential migrants who are exploited or abused during the recruitment process lack a platform 
for raising their voice.
Challenges •	 Networking among government, representatives from recruiting agents, and representatives from 
trade unions who uphold the voice migrant workers.
Guidelines
(in line with the ILO 
Multilateral Framework 
on Labour Migration)
• Establishing tripartite procedures to ensure that employers’ and workers’ organizations are 
consulted on labour migration issues and their views taken into account.
Good practices for 
imitation
Philippines: POEA has a tripartite governing board consisting of the Secretary of Labour and Employment, 
representatives of other concerned government departments, a workers’ representative from the Trade 
Union Congress of the Philippines, and an employers’ representative from the association of private 
recruiting agencies. 
India: Under tripartite cooperation among the Indian mission in Kuwait, the Kuwait Union of Domestic 
Labour Offices (KUDLO), and the Kuwaiti legal firm Al-Haqooq, domestic workers who have problems 
with their employers are provided legal support. (Rajput, 2011).
Recommendation • A permanent platform in Bangladesh can be made under the supervision of MEWOE through 
which migrants can register their views and concerns, and negotiate with the government and 
recruiting agents.
Existing practices •	 In many cases, loss of employment results in termination of a migrant worker’s visa.
Challenges •	 Ensure secure jobs and visas for migrant workers. 
Guidelines
(in line with the ILO 
Multilateral Framework 
on Labour Migration)
• Adopting measures to ensure that migrant workers lawfully within the country enjoy equal treatment 
with nationals regarding employment and training opportunities after a reasonable period of 
employment, and, upo  n loss of their employment, are allowed sufficient time to find other work.
Good practices for 
imitation
Italy: The loss of employment or resignation from employment of non-EU migrant workers in regular 
status does not automatically result in withdrawal of their residence permits. They are entitled to 
registration on placements lists until their residence permits expire.
Recommendation • Persuade countries of destination to ensure arrangements through which migrant workers do not 
lose their residency status immediately after being terminated from their job.
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Existing practices •	 During the recruitment process potential migrant workers are not covered by important social 
security instruments, such as long-term insurance schemes, membership in trade unions, etc.7
Challenges •	 Ensure a social safety net for migrant workers. 
•	 Ensure equal rights.
Guidelines
(in line with the ILO 
Multilateral Framework 
on Labour Migration)
• Adopting measures to ensure that all migrant workers benefit from the provisions of all relevant 
international labour standards in accordance with Principles 8 and 9 of this Framework.
Good practices for 
imitation
Philippines: An agreement requires recruiting agencies that recruit workers for foreign ships to make 
quarterly payments to the Philippines social security system. Workers are covered by social security 
upon signing the standard seafarer employment contract, with the recruiting agent and the foreign 
ship owner as employers
Turkey: All migrant workers in Turkey have been brought under the compulsory coverage of statutory 
long-term insurance schemes in conformity with Article 3(1) of the Equality of Treatment (Social Security) 
Convention, 1962 (No. 118).
Recommendation • Government needs to establish an agreement that requires recruiting agencies to ensure different 
payment/benefit structures for migrant working in risky jobs.
Existing practices •	 Workers are often recruited to work for abusive employers.
Challenges •	 Elimination of abusive employers from the recruitment process.
Guidelines
(in line with the ILO 
Multilateral Framework 
on Labour Migration)
• Governments should formulate and implement, in consultation with social partners, measures to 
prevent abusive practices, migrant smuggling, and trafficking in persons; they should also work 
towards preventing irregular labour migration.
Good practices for 
imitation
Saudi Arabia: In July 2005, the Ministry of Labour of Saudi Arabia announced the formation of a special 
department to protect the rights of domestic migrant workers and impose sanctions on employers who 
abuse them. In such cases, employers may be banned from applying for any domestic house worker 
for five years.
Recommendation • The Government of Bangladesh can persuade other countries of destination to adopt such 
strategies through which abusive employers will be banned from the recruitment process.
7 ILO Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97) prohibits inequality of treatment between migrant workers and 
nationals arising out of laws or regulations or the practices of the administrative authorities in four area: living and working conditions, 
social security, employment taxes and access to justice (Article 6).
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Existing practices •	 Migrants are exploited by non-licensed recruiting agents/intermediaries due to lack of correct 
information about them.
Challenges •	 Dissemination of information about recruiting agents/ intermediaries who are guided by ill motives, 
or are unregistered with the government.
Guidelines
(in line with the ILO 
Multilateral Framework 
on Labour Migration)
• Disseminating information on trafficking to warn potential victims of its dangers and raise public 
awareness on the issue.
• Facilitating migrant workers’ departure, journey, and reception in language they understand. 
• Imparting information, training and assistance prior to migrants’ departure and on arrival 
concerning the migration process, their rights, and the general conditions of life and work in the 
destination country.
Good practices for 
imitation
Philippines: POEA provides information on its website about licensed private recruiters, job vacancies 
abroad, and the locations of consulates in destination countries. It also provides advice and warnings to 
those intending to migrate through recruiters involved in unethical labour migration practices.
Sri Lanka: Consulates have labour welfare officers to provide information and assistance to migrant 
workers in destination countries, particularly women. 
Recommendation • Adoption of different means for disseminating information regarding unlicensed or unethical 
recruiting agents/ intermediaries and also the causes and consequences of irregular migration.
Existing practices •	 Lack of intergovernmental communication in dealing with recruiting agents. Bangladesh can do 
very little if recruiting agents in countries of destination violate migrant workers’ rights.
Challenges •	 Ensure inter-government communication in dealing with recruiting agents.
Guidelines
(in line with the ILO 
Multilateral Framework 
on Labour Migration)
• Ensuring that migrant workers receive understandable and enforceable employment contracts.
• Providing arrangements to ensure that recruitment and placement services do not recruit, place, 
or employ workers in jobs which involve unacceptable hazards or risks or abusive or discriminatory 
treatment of any kind and informing migrant workers in a language they understand of the nature 
of the position offered and the terms and conditions of employment.
Good practices for 
imitation
Mauritius-China: A bilateral agreement between Mauritius and China has provisions for actions to be 
taken by each country to protect Chinese migrant workers. China submits information to Mauritius 
on unreliable recruiting agents. Mauritius submits employment contracts to the Chinese Embassy to 
ensure conformity with Chinese  law and uniformity between the Chinese and English versions of 
contracts (one signed in China and one in Mauritius). 
Recommendation • Bangladesh can go into bilateral agreements with destination countries for controlling the unethical 
practices of recruiting agents.
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Existing practices •	 Lack of control over recruiting agents located in countries of destination for ensuring ethical labour 
migration.
Challenges •	 Ensure decent control over recruiting agents located countries of destination.
Guidelines
(in line with the ILO 
Multilateral Framework 
on Labour Migration)
• Working on and implementing legislation and policies containing effective enforcement mechanisms 
and sanctions to deter unethical practices, including provisions for the prohibition of private 
employment agencies engaging in unethical practices and the suspension or withdrawal of their 
licenses in case of violation.
Good practices for 
imitation
Sri Lanka: Consulates in destination countries register recruiting agencies and companies that recruit 
Sri Lankan workers, and only those registered are authorized to enter into contracts with workers. There 
are MoUs with recruiters in GCC States, Hong Kong (China), and Singapore for Sri Lankan Government 
approval of employment contracts for domestic workers and investigations of employers.
Recommendation • Assigning the consulates of Bangladesh in countries of destination to oversee the recruiting agents 
currently recruiting workers from Bangladesh.
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Bilateral and regional 
policies and agreements 
with major destination 
countries
C h a p t e r   5
5.1 Existing bilateral and regional 
policies and agreements
International labour migration-based development 
incurs tremendous economic and social cost. 
Many migrants experience serious abuse and 
exploitation during migration, both in countries 
of origin and destination. Moreover, rising cross-
border movement of labour has led to the growth 
of irregular migration, as well as human trafficking 
and human smuggling. This scenario has become 
a matter of concern not only for the origin and 
destination countries but also for transit countries. 
This scenario advocates for the necessity of 
bilateral, multilateral, and regional policies and 
frameworks aimed at reducing the abuses and 
exploitation associated with international labour 
migration. 
The Government of Bangladesh is involved in a 
number of bilateral and multilateral agreements, 
frameworks, and MoUs. MEWOE has signed 
bilateral MoUs with Libya, Qatar, Oman, Malaysia, 
the Republic of Korea, Kuwait, and the United 
Arab Emirates, which have introduced quotas for 
the number of Bangladeshi migrants being sent 
and also delineated minimum labour standards 
(Rajput, 2011). Certain notable agreements 
and frameworks in which the Government of 
Bangladesh is involved are delineated in the 
sections below.
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5.1.1 Bilateral negotiations, frameworks, 
agreements, MoUs
The Bangladesh Government has started a formal 
process of sending workers to Malaysia through 
a government-to-government arrangement. 
Under this process, the first batch of Bangladeshi 
workers (70 individuals) left Dhaka to take up 
plantation jobs in Malaysia on 25 April 2013. 
Amidst the international labour migration deadlock 
Bangladesh has experienced over the last few 
years, the Government of Bangladesh was able 
to negotiate the opening of the Malaysian labour 
market through a government-to-government 
initiative. The government was also able to set 
an example of migration at low cost by fixing the 
maximum cost at BDT40,000. 
In recent years through bilateral negotiation, 
Bangladesh has succeeded in regularizing 
undocumented migrants in some GCC countries 
and Malaysia. Through an effective discussion 
with the Malaysian government, about 267,803 
Bangladeshi migrant workers who entered 
Malaysia through irregular channels have already 
been registered for regularization. Additionally, 
experts and key informants have stated that this 
strategy proved effective in better ensuring safe 
migration, particularly with regard to the security 
of women migrant workers. Moreover, some 
more positive outcomes of this strategy include 
the better ensuring of workers’ rights in terms of 
wage scales, working and living conditions, levels 
of social protection (for example, medical care 
and compensation), and access to instruments of 
social dialogue, such as freedom of association. 
The Bangladesh Government has announced a 
similar recruitment process for sending migrant 
workers to Hong Kong, China. At the initial stage 
of this process, 80,000 female workers will be 
sent to take up domestic worker jobs. Potential 
migrants selected to go to Hong Kong, China, 
will attend a two-month training course on the 
work they will be performing. To travel to Hong 
Kong the workers will not need to pay any money 
upfront. Airfare will be about BDT40,000, and it 
will be deducted from their salary for the first few 
months on the job. The women workers will be 
paid about BDT40,000 per month. 
Under another government-to-government 
arrangement, BOESL is engaged in processing 
aspirant migrants to the Republic of Korea at 
a cost of BDT56,000, including air fare (this 
is all done under the Republic of Korea’s EPS 
arrangement). Previously, the Korean government 
stopped recruiting Bangladeshi workers due 
to massive corruption and irregularities in the 
management of migration (often by the private 
recruiting agencies) and the high cost. Following 
the forging of the government-to-government 
initiative, the Korean government reopened their 
labour market to Bangladeshi migrant workers. 
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Recommendations
C h a p t e r   6
Awareness-building activities: The cost of 
migration is associated not only with demand 
side factors (demand in the labour market, 
the conduct of recruiting agents) but also with 
supply side factors (the availability of labour, the 
attitude and knowledge level of workers about 
the labour migration process, etc.). Hence, the 
cost of migration can be reduced by a significant 
amount by raising awareness among potential 
migrant workers on ethical migration. Although 
such institution-building processes incur 
more cost and time, they can lead to a more 
sustainable, ethical practice of migration. For the 
sake of generating awareness regarding ethical 
migration practices, the following measures can 
be taken: (a) Since the information gap halts 
the smooth operation of the migration system 
and, in turn, can lead to human trafficking and 
irregular migration, a detailed understanding 
of overseas labour recruitment can empower 
potential migrants to bargain with recruiting 
agencies/illegal intermediaries or sub-agents. 
Against the backdrop of substantial international 
migration, the Government has already decided 
to include education about regular forms of 
migration in schoolbooks. This is a positive 
initiative undertaken by the Government 
of Bangladesh, and this integration of 
information about the labour migration 
process into education curriculums and 
textbooks (at the primary, secondary, and 
tertiary levels) needs to be carried out in an 
urgent manner. (b) By launching a mass 
media campaign on the labour migration 
process (frequent advertisements on TV 
and radio, as well as in newspapers), the 
Government can raise awareness among 
potential migrants about labour migration 
issues.
Curbing the role of sub-agents/intermediaries: 
Since the role of intermediaries is one of 
the key factors for increasing recruitment 
and migration cost, the cost of migration 
for less-skilled and semi-skilled workers 
need to be reduced by curbing the role 
of intermediaries at both ends (i.e., in 
Bangladesh and countries of destination). 
The role of intermediaries can be reduced 
by means of following measures:
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n	 Recruiting agents need to be regulated 
under a new legal framework.
n	 Government-to-government recruitment 
initiatives should be encouraged.
n	 Relevant agencies (namely, BOESL 
and BMET) should be strengthened in 
their ability to search for and offer more 
overseas jobs.
n	 The government needs to encourage 
potential migrant workers to grow sceptical 
of illegal intermediaries or sub-agents. 
The dominance of sub-agents and 
intermediaries will get reduced only when 
the government can convince migrants into 
reposing trust in formal labour migration 
channels (e.g., licensed recruiting agents, 
government-to-government initiatives). This 
trust-building requires decentralization and 
institutionalization of the labour migration 
process.
n	 The government needs to take the initiative 
to curb the role of illegal intermediaries or 
sub-agents in countries of destination. 
By means of bilateral negotiations with 
the governments of destination countries 
and expansions of the work area of 
Bangladeshi labour attaché, the role of 
illegal intermediaries or sub-agents in 
destination countries can be curbed. 
The government can take the initiative 
and establish institutional mechanisms 
through which recruiting agents from 
Bangladesh can directly communicate 
with employers in destination countries. 
Elimination of costs being borne by migrant workers: 
As per Article 7, Clause 1 of ILO Convention No. 
181, member States need to take initiative in 
line with the principle that “Private employment 
agencies shall not charge directly or indirectly, in 
whole or in part, any fees or costs to workers.” 
In line with this benchmark, the Government of 
Bangladesh can devise policy and regulatory 
instruments to ensure that all such costs are to be 
borne by employers instead. This initiative would 
be more effective if the government would consider 
a timeframe within which it would try to achieve 
that target. Since these sorts of initiatives need to 
involve countries of destination as stakeholders, 
the Government of Bangladesh should negotiate 
with countries of destination and develop MoUs 
and agreements to address the issue. 
Oversight and supervision of recruiting agencies 
by the government: In a free market economy, the 
role of recruiting agents in the recruitment process 
is undeniable. Therefore, rather than eliminating 
recruiting agents from the labour migration 
system, the government can make them workable 
through formulations/revisions of policies/acts/
rules and the effective implementation of those 
policies/acts/rules. In this regard, the Government 
of Bangladesh also can assign the consulates of 
Bangladesh in destination countries to oversee the 
recruiting agents currently recruiting workers from 
Bangladesh. New laws need to be incorporated 
into the legal framework, and as such, they must 
prove efficacious in penalizing recruiting agents 
involved in unethical practices. Incentives for 
recruiting agents also can be fruitful in guiding 
them to practice ethical recruitment. 
Oversight and supervision of recruiting agent: In 
order to ensure institutional compliance with any 
code of conduct, internal compliance mechanisms 
prove much more effective and sustainable than 
external pressure. Therefore, the existing association 
of private recruiting agents – BAIRA – should 
be more proactive in adopting an ethical code of 
conduct for private recruiting agents and devising 
internal compliance and monitoring mechanisms to 
ensure their members’ compliance. BAIRA should 
seek support from the Government of Bangladesh 
and the ILO for institutional development and for 
playing a self-regulatory role. Strong networking 
among the Government of Bangladesh, BAIRA, 
and the ILO can give a labour standards-based 
push to the implementation of the laws and policies 
of the government and is likely to have a greater 
impact at the grassroots level. BAIRA should also 
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formulate effective strategies for collaborating with 
the government to research international labour 
markets. 
Provision of financing migration costs from formal 
financing sectors: Lack of access to the formal 
banking system leads migrant workers to finance 
their migration costs from the informal sector. 
Considering the high interest rates charged for 
this sort of credit, the total migration cost turns out 
to be considerably more than the cost traditional 
estimation infers. Reliance on the informal banking 
system (i.e., moneylenders) by migrant workers 
for financing migration cost is a tremendous 
drawback within the migration process in 
Bangladesh. Therefore, the inclusion of potential 
migrant workers in the formal banking process 
is necessary. Relevant NGOs, commercial banks 
(both State-owned and private), and government 
bodies can be actively involved in generating less 
costly financing for migration. Bangladesh Bank 
can direct and encourage commercial banks to 
finance migration costs under a Corporate Social 
Responsibility arrangement. 
Ensuring migrant workers’ right to information: It is 
obvious that access to information can increase 
the negotiating power of migrant workers. Though 
under the existing rules and regulations, potential 
migrant workers can avail themselves of certain 
information on the recruitment process, job 
contracts, and the cost structure of migration, in 
reality, such practices are observed at a minimum 
level. This being the case, proper mechanisms 
need to be developed under the auspices of 
the government. Such mechanisms will compel 
recruiting agents to share all relevant information 
with migrant workers and potential migrant 
workers (e.g., providing a Bengali version of the 
contract paper and easily understandable legal 
statements). In this connection, the following 
instruments need to be improved/implemented:
n	 pre-departure briefing by BMET;
n	 dissemination of information on the 
migration process among interested 
potential migrant workers through the use 
of notice boards or websites;
n	 dissemination of information about 
common unethical practices in migration 
though decentralized workshops, 
seminars, etc.; and
n	 publication of information on recruiting 
agents who are involved in good practices/
bad practices.
Compilation and analysis of labour market 
information: International labour migration 
decisions (both those made by the government 
and by individual employers and workers) need to 
be based on rational cost-benefit analyses. Such 
rationality can be viable only when the analysis 
is made on the basis of true and substantial 
information. Therefore, the easy availability of 
labour market information (such as the supply 
of and demand for labour) in both countries 
of origin and countries of destination is quite 
instrumental in making migration decisions and 
policy frameworks. This information base can be 
developed and shared through various initiatives 
under bilateral agreements/MoUs between 
Bangladesh and destination countries, and with 
the assistance of Inter governmental agencies like 
the ILO. The ILO has been assisting many Member 
States in generating labour market data and 
forecasting employment trends. The formulation 
of joint electronic profiles that list job requirements 
and worker skills can be considered a good option.
Dissemination of international labour market 
information among potential migrant workers: 
It is evident that Bangladeshi brokers and 
intermediaries have a near monopoly over overseas 
labour market information, which they receive 
through their overseas brokers/intermediaries 
(sub-agents). Therefore, they are in position of 
shaping and influencing the migration decisions of 
potential migrant workers. Overstated information 
can allure potential migrants into bearing 
additional migration cost. However, apart from 
relatives and intermediaries, potential migrant 
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worker do not have any platform from which they 
can avail themselves of relevant overseas labour 
market information. Hence, the Government of 
Bangladesh can maintain a Migration Information 
System which can be updated on a monthly or 
quarterly basis. This information can be shared 
with potential migrants through various means, 
like websites, billboards, notice boards (at DEMOs, 
the BMET, and the offices of recruiting agencies), 
mass media, etc.
Incorporation of proper documentation facilities: 
Through the BMET and MEWOE, the Government 
of Bangladesh has already implemented several 
documentation mechanisms for labour migration 
purposes. These initiatives include: mandatory 
registration for potential migrant workers (Smart 
Card); documentation during processing for a 
BMET clearance certificate; and digitization of the 
embarkation-disembarkation card. However, a 
single database platform containing every piece of 
information that is incorporated into the National 
ID card, passport, recruitment information 
(including follow-up information), etc. needs to be 
developed. 
Promotion of trade unions and alliances between 
trade unions of Bangladesh and destination 
countries: The Government of Bangladesh needs 
to promote the formation of migrant worker labour 
associations. The provision of trade unions in 
Bangladesh and also in destination countries can 
increase the bargaining power of migrant workers. 
Through multilateral or bilateral frameworks/
agreements, the government can also encourage 
destination countries allow for the formulation 
of effective trade unions within their borders. 
Creating an environment for networking between 
Bangladeshi trade unions and destination country 
trade unions is also a good practice for creating 
and managing an ethical labour migration process. 
The government also can provide technical 
support for local trade unions so that they can 
be linked into international trade union networks. 
The government can consider the lessons 
drawn from several initiatives by international 
trade union bodies and the ILO in different 
countries. In this connection, the government of 
Bangladesh can accept assistance from the ILO 
to be connected with international trade union 
bodies and to facilitate international cooperation 
between Bangladeshi and overseas trade unions. 
Bangladeshi missions could assist in the formation 
of cultural associations and support groups of 
migrant workers in countries of destination. Such 
social networks can prove highly functional in 
minimizing social insecurity and establishing 
workers’ rights in destination countries.
Extensive empirical research: Policy-makers find 
it extremely difficult to formulate any policy in 
connection with labour migration owing to the 
unavailability of a great deal of information about 
the issue. Therefore the labour migration system 
needs to be explored and analyzed. In a true 
sense, it needs to be overhauled by the initiation 
of extensive empirical research. Cooperation can 
be established among countries of destination and 
origin, and also among international organizations 
like the ILO and UNCTAD, in order to develop 
labour migration-oriented surveys/censuses.
Expansion of the resources and scope of MEWOE 
and the BMET: In recent years, MEWOE and the 
BMET have diversified their activities to deal with 
labour recruitment and migration issues more 
effectively. However, there are also allegations 
that these institutions are failing to perform their 
functions effectively in some arenas. Causes of 
this lack of functionality can be attributed to the 
following problems:
n	 A private recruiting agent regulation and 
monitoring mechanism that is too limited: 
Although MEWOE and the BMET have 
developed regulating and monitoring 
mechanisms, those mechanisms needs 
to be strengthened by further review and 
reorganization. Since such monitoring 
must be a continuous process, the 
development of a strong institutional 
framework comprising more resources 
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and a larger workforce is essential. The 
representation and participation of women 
and men migrant workers’ associations in 
this institutional framework also needs to 
be ensured;
n	 Limited resources of MEWOE and the 
BMET: According to BMET officials, the 
BMET has substantially less human 
resources than required for managing its 
activities. What is urgently needed is an 
increase in budget allocation and human 
resources to these two institutions, as this 
is a pressing need and true hindrance 
in creating an adequate regulatory 
mechanism for overseas migration.
There are also allegations that media campaigns 
for safe migration awareness (which are supposed 
to be handled by MEWOE and the BMET) are still 
scant. Therefore, DEMOs needed to be expanded 
in all districts of Bangladesh. Increasing the 
workforce of those institutions is also major a 
concern in this connection. 
Among others, the following specific steps can 
be taken to strengthen the MEWOE:
n	 Establishment of an autonomous Labour 
Market Research Centre staffed with 
professional, high calibre researchers, 
which could be set up with the technical 
assistance of specialized institutions like 
the ILO, UNESCO, FAO, etc. to ensure 
multidisciplinary attention to the issue 
of migration. This Centre could operate 
under a public-private model, which 
would open room for recruiting agencies 
and private sector entities (such as local 
employers’ associations) to play a role.
n	 Promotion of an institutional framework 
for carrying out annual Training Needs 
Assessments among the staff in the 
MEWOE, BMET, DEMOs, TTCs, BOESL, 
PKB, and all other execution or welfare 
bodies of the MEWOE.
n	 Decentralization of functions, capacity 
strengthening and performance 
management of the DEMOs. For instance, 
pre-departure briefing and awareness 
campaigns may be delegated to DEMOs 
and their performance assessed every 
three months to provide timely support to 
those DEMOs that require assistance.
Bilateral agreements between Bangladesh and 
destination countries: government should enter 
into agreements with the governments of the 
destination countries in the following areas:
n	 Detrimental visa trading in country of 
destinations should be curbed under 
regulation. More specifically, involvement 
of sub-agents (at recipient countries) 
in recruitment process needs to be 
controlled.
n	 Bangladesh can negotiate with destination 
countries for common minimum standards 
of migration cost as well as wages and 
terms and conditions of employment 
consistent with the labour law of the 
country of destination concerned.
n	 High recruitment cost and less opportunity 
of legal migration encourage people to take 
alternative irregular process of migration 
i.e., trafficking in person, smuggling of 
human being. Provision of better supply 
side (available opportunity of legal 
migration) would reduce for alternative 
demand for irregular migration. Hence, 
Government of Bangladesh has already 
taken initiative to explore overseas labour 
for Bangladeshi migrants. However, more 
energy is need to be involved for expanding 
existing labour market and open up the 
restricted labour market. 
n	 Government of Bangladesh can persuade 
destination countries for adopting such 
strategies through which abusive employer 
will be banned from recruitment process.
The cost
Causes of and redress related to the high recruitment and migration costs in Bangladesh
70
n	 To share country-specific international 
labour migration statistics, 
intergovernmental agreements are needed 
between Bangladesh and countries of 
destination.
n	 To facilitate direct labour recruitment by 
the recruiter, bilateral agreement can be 
made to establish an organized database. 
Such database would allow employer of 
one country to directly recruit employee 
from Bangladesh.
n	 Bilateral or multilateral agreement can 
be made to arrange temporary labour 
migration among signatory countries.
Networking with intergovernmental agencies by 
the government: Intergovernmental agencies 
(e.g., the ILO) can act as an intermediary 
between Bangladesh and destination countries 
in balancing the interests of both governments. In 
fact, the scope of the ILO is wider in the arena 
of decent international labour migration. First, it is 
the only agent to set international labour standards 
for the protection of all workers and economies. 
Moreover, the ILO has a framework that allows for 
tripartite (i.e., government, trade unions/workers’ 
organization, and employers) social dialogue 
for consensus building on important issues. It 
is notable that, any formal intergovernmental 
regional or inter-regional work on the protection 
of labour rights requires the involvement of the 
ILO. Therefore, the initiation of a strong network 
with intergovernmental agencies would be a very 
practical choice for the government and workers’ 
organizations.
Technical collaboration with international 
organizations : the Government of Bangladesh 
could seek technical assistance to address the 
issues related to recruitment and migration 
costs, emigration and immigration systems, and 
development of standard terms and conditions of 
employment, including occupational safety and 
health, protection of workers, social security of 
migrant workers, etc.
Addressing gaps incoordination: Increasing 
recruitment and migration costs and deteriorating 
conditions facing migrant workers indicate that 
coordination mechanisms among government 
institutions involve in managing the international 
labour migration system are not functioning 
properly. An interministerial committee should be 
established to support coordination of the labour 
migration process. Following the example of the 
Philippines, a central and national monitoring 
committee headed by the Minister of MEWOE can 
bring in public oversight to the labour migration 
process. Engagement of social partners such as 
the trade unions, migrant workers’ associations, 
and employers’ associations would ensure that 
the MEWOE is also informed about the public 
perceptions and challenges that the workers 
may be facing or issues that require immediate 
attention. There is a need for a higher level inter-
ministerial coordination committee that includes 
the relevant government ministries: Ministry of 
Home Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MEWOE, 
Ministry of Women and Children Affairs, Ministry 
of Social Welfare, Ministry of Law,  Justice and 
Parliamentary Affairs, Ministry of Health and Family 
Welfare, and Ministry of Information, and other 
related ministries. This higher level committee 
could provide redress when situations requiring 
cooperation between various ministries and/or 
inter-ministerial policy decisions are required. It 
would be highly useful in coordinating responses 
when workers are in crisis situations overseas. 
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List of key informants 
interviewed
A n n e x   1
List of key informants interviewed (in alphabetic order)
1. Asjadul Kibria (Business Page Editor, The Daily Prothom Alo).
2. Emigration official who spoke on condition of anonymity.
3. Kamruzzaman (Area Manager, Thengamara Mohila Sabuj Sangha-TMSS, Tangail).
4. Kawser Ahmed (Advocate, Supreme Court of Bangladesh).
5. Masud Parvez (Secretary General, Welfare Association of Repatriated Bangladeshi Employees-
WARBE).
6. Md. Ismail Hossain (Chief Executive, UAE, Janata Bank Ltd.).
7. Md. Mahbubur Rahman (MD, Janata Exchange Company Italy, SRL).
8. Md. Nurul Islam, PhD (Director-Training Standard and Planning, Bureau of Manpower, 
Employment and Training-BMET).
9. Md. Omar Faruque Chowdhury (Executive Director, Ovibashi Karmi Unnayan Program-OKUP)
10. Md. Shahjalal Mazumder, President, BAIRA.
11. Representatives from three recruiting agencies (spoke on condition of anonymity).
12. Illegal intermediaries or sub-agents (spoke on condition of anonymity).
13. Shamim Ahmed Chowdhury Noman (EC Member, BAIRA).
14. Shariful Hasan (Senior Reporter, The Daily Prothom Alo).
15. Sumaiya Islam (Director, Bangladesh Ovibashi Mohila Sramik Association-BOMSA).
16. Syed Mahbub Elahi (Chairman, Ovibashi Karmi Kallyan Foundation-OKKAF).
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The Cost: Causes of and potential 
redress for high recruitment and 
migration costs in Bangladesh
Regulatory governance of international recruitment is the crux of 
the challenges associated with international labour migration. 
This study suggests that Bangladesh has been trying to make 
international recruitment cost effective, transparent, and 
consistent by bringing into force a variety of measures. 
Bangladesh also took on the challenge of formulating and 
adopting comprehensive national laws and policies on labour 
migration. This study highlights challenges that need to be 
overcome to strengthen labour migration governance, as well as, 
the long walk to reform that has yet to be covered.
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